



ICCLR

International Centre for Criminal Law Reform

**BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
MUNICIPAL CORRUPTION**

Trevor Hunt

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Introduction

In its continuing work on anti-corruption, the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Reform (ICCLR) contracted with Trevor Hunt,¹ a law student at the University of British Columbia, to research and develop a bibliography on the literature of municipal corruption, both in Canada and abroad. The task was obviously a huge undertaking as the world is a big place and corruption seeps into everyday life in virtually all countries. It can be particularly endemic at the municipal level, where government is closest to the people and familiarity between politicians, bureaucrats, and the citizens they serve is not uncommon. Despite the susceptibility to corruption which we find at the municipal level of government, little has been written about it by comparison to police corruption, corruption at senior levels of government, and by heads of state.

Mr. Hunt has done an admirable job of sifting through the world wide web of academic, government, and other literature to distill a lengthy working document which provides key jumping off points for any researcher interested in this important but little discussed area of corruption. He has also annotated the bibliography with just enough narrative to wet the appetite of a researcher and provide a guide for further enquiry. At ICCLR, we are pleased to host this bibliography as an important contribution to the literature of anti-corruption, joining the many other documents devoted to this subject on our website.

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Methodological Note

This guide is intended to provide a list of resources for individuals who are researching municipal corruption whether they are academics, municipal employees, elected officials, lawyers or otherwise. This list is not exhaustive and is intended to provide individuals with starting points for researching municipal corruption, in Canada and around the world.

The focus of this bibliography is on criminal acts of corruption (bribery, fraud, embezzlement, vote buying, breach of trust, etc.)² and their prevention as opposed to ‘soft’ or non-criminal corruption. Some sources are included to help readers delineate between criminal and non-criminal acts of corruption. Additionally, some sources that were not municipally focused were included due to their applicability to municipal issues.³ Police corruption was not a focus as it is often studied outside the municipal context.

There is a Canadian emphasis due to the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy being a Canada-based research centre. Following the creation of a section on Canadian legislation, case law, and secondary sources, a thorough review of international sources such as journals, books, reports, and other publications was conducted. Documents, guides, and reports by inter-governmental organizations as well as NGOs are included, many of which contain frameworks that are designed to be applicable to any jurisdiction.

Some regions may be absent or may have a limited number of sources due to either a lack of available research, research being unavailable in English, or due to time constraints. Some sources are not in English but have English descriptions indicating the contents. Sources that did not have an English description were excluded.

There is a focus on both recent and online sources. Recent sources were emphasized because they often summarize prior research in their literature review sections. The emphasis on online sources was necessitated due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and all sources are hyperlinked either directly or to a page that contains a description and direct link to the resource.

A modified McGill citation style was used, with clarity and usability as the main principles (e.g. hyperlinks used instead of written URLs). Sources are listed alphabetically unless denoted otherwise, with listings by the same primary author chronologized. Sources with no attributions to an author are listed at the start of their respective sections as they are often government reports or key sources.

² *Definitions of Corruption – Research Brief no. 48* (Ottawa, Public Safety Canada, Last Modified 2018)

³ This is noted in the description of the relevant sources where possible.

Canada

Legislation⁴

[*Criminal Code*](#), RSC 1985, c-46⁵

Section 121 of the Criminal Code is the provision on Fraud on Government, which can be committed by both private individuals and government officials by giving or accepting bribes respectively. Often supports charges under sections 122 and 123.

Section 122 of the Criminal Code is the provision on breach of trust by a public officer.

Section 123 of the Criminal Code is Canada's federal legislative provision on municipal corruption. Subsection 1 is the provision for corrupt acts by a municipal official while subsection 2 is for acts influencing a municipal official. Most recently amended by Bill C-75, which received royal assent on 19 June 2019.

Section 425(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is offenses by employers, which criminalizes retaliation against employees who provide information to law enforcement if they believe their employer has committed an offense.

Section 465(1) of the Criminal Code criminalizes conspiracy and is discussed in some cases where an individual has been charged with an offense under s.122 or s.123.

[*An Act to facilitate the disclosure of wrongdoings relating to public bodies*](#), CQLR 2016, c. 7

Quebec's whistleblower legislation which was implemented following the results of the Charbonneau Inquiry.

[*Anti-Corruption Act*](#), CQLR 2011, c. L-6.1

Québec's provincial anti-corruption act passed in response to high levels of corruption in the province – intention was to consolidate resources and investigations. Established investigative and enforcement powers of the Unité permanente anticorruption (UPAC). The Charbonneau Commission, cited below, is an example of a UPAC investigation and report.

City of Hamilton, by-law no 19-181, [*Whistleblower By-law*](#), (12 July 2019)

[From Description] “The by-law protects all City of Hamilton employees who report serious wrongdoing from job-related reprisals. The By-law obligates all employees or members of Council with supervisory or management responsibilities to ensure that an employee is not subject to reprisal and that employees under their direction are made aware of the By-law.”

[*Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act*](#), SC 1998, c. 34

⁴ Legislation listed in order of relevance

⁵ See Case Law section for jurisprudence related to sections 122 and 123

Federal legislation criminalizing the act of influencing foreign government officials. There have been no convictions under the CFPOA for influencing a foreign municipal official, but individuals would be prosecuted under this act if it were to occur.

[Public Interest Disclosure Act](#), SBC 2018, c. 22

British Columbia's provincial whistleblower protection legislation with the objective of "[providing employees and former employees of public bodies covered by PIDA with a safe conduit for disclosing allegations of wrongdoing in public sector workplaces."⁶ Currently does not apply to municipal governments but provincial government has expressed it will within 5 years.⁷

[The Public Interest Disclosure \(Whistleblower Protection\) Act](#), C.C.S.M. 2018, c. P217

Manitoba's provincial whistleblower legislation which explicitly includes municipalities within its scope in s.2.

Journals, Books & Other Sources

["Guide to Implementing Whistleblowing in Saskatchewan Municipalities"](#), (Date N/A) online:
Government of Saskatchewan

Provincial guide that provides best practices and recommendations to municipalities within the province of Saskatchewan, so that they can implement whistleblower protection policy and encourage the reporting of unethical or corrupt behavior. Links to other Canadian whistleblower legislation are included on Page 11.

[Commission d'enquête sur l'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l'industrie de la construction](#), vols 1-4 (Québec: Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public Contracts in the Construction Industry, 2015)

[Source in French] Completed Charbonneau Commission report, with all volumes including: volume 1 on contextual need for commission; volume 2 on argued facts; and volume 4 on references.

["Ex-Terrebonne mayor, former top city officials arrested by UPAC"](#) (15 March 2018) online:
CBC News

Brief description of charges and individuals involved in kickback scheme in Terrebonne, Quebec. Trial decisions have yet to be released, and this source is included primarily to provide a list of names of the accused individuals to aid in finding eventual judgments.

⁶ [BC Ombusperson's Annual Report 2019/2020](#)

⁷ *Ibid.*

[Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public Contracts in the Construction Industry](#), vol 3 (Québec: Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public Contracts in the Construction Industry, 2017)

English translation of volume 3⁸ of the Charbonneau Commission’s report on public procurement corruption in Quebec, at both provincial and municipal levels. Investigation focused on bid-rigging, collusion between bidders, and organized crime involvement in the industry. Host webpage includes footage of Sonia LeBel, lead counsel for the inquiry, discussing the report. Please see next page for report volumes 1, 2 & 4 in French.

[“Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry/Toronto External Contracts Inquiry”](#) (2005) online: *City of Toronto*

[Report comprised of four volumes](#), completed as part of the Bellamy inquiry into IT contracts in Toronto, where the city was hit with a surprise near-doubling in leasing costs. 241 recommendations were made to the City of Toronto to resolve issues with the unethical behavior, fraudulence, and conflicts of interest in procurement that resulted in secretive contracts. Please also see the city’s [Progress Report on implementation of recommendations](#), one year after the report.

Andrew Sancton, [“Accountability Officers and Integrity in Canadian Municipal Government”](#) (Toronto, CA: Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance, 2017)

History of Accountability Officers and their roles, powers, and investigations across Canada. Highlights strengths and weaknesses of accountability mechanisms by comparing cities in different provinces.

City of Surrey, Corporate Services Department, [“Creation of an Ethics Office”](#), *Corporate Report R107* (4 June 2019)

Report from Surrey’s municipal administration to Council on the creation of an ethics office. Details the legislative sources of power for municipal governments and related oversight in Canada, and how an ethics office would interact with existing rule frameworks such as Surrey’s Community Charter. Source included because it highlights how Canadian municipalities approach ethics offices with a notable lack of consideration of criminal municipal corruption beyond acknowledging it is governed by the Criminal Code.

Demi Knight, [“Calgary Police ask RCMP to conduct investigation into Coun. Joe Magliocca expenses”](#) (29 July 2020) online: *The Calgary Herald*

News release describing the process by which Calgary Councillor Joe Magliocca’s suspicious expenses were investigated and referred to the Calgary Police Service and RCMP.

⁸ Volumes 1,2, and 4 have not been translated but are listed below. Volume 3 details the schemes, causes of corruption, the consequences of collusion, and the recommendations of the commission.

Denis Saint-Martin, "[Systemic Corruption in an Advanced Welfare State: Lessons from the Quebec Charbonneau Inquiry](#)" (2016) 53:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 66

Study on the Charbonneau Inquiry and how the sociopolitical history of Québec created an ecosystem where construction companies could easily co-opt and take advantage of municipal governments for corrupt purposes.

Elizabeth Anderson, "[Municipal “Best Practices”: Preventing Fraud, Bribery and Corruption](#)" (2013) online: *International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy*

Provides a brief overview of forms of corruption that may occur at the municipal level and links to other sources and guides that provide frameworks on the establishment of anti-corruption policies, municipal codes of conduct, and other frameworks that govern the behavior of municipal officials.

Greg Levine, "[Conflict, Conduct & Corruption: Worldliness and the Shaking of the Foundations of Ethical Governance](#)" (2013) 123:4 *Municipal World* 5,7-8, 36

Analysis of conflicts of interest that attempts to identify the nature of municipal corruption and the difference between criminal corruption as defined by s.123 of the Criminal Code and non-criminal conflicts of interest.

Graham Hughes et al., "[Mayoral mischief: Canada’s growing cities face a problem of oversight](#)" (12 January 2014) online: *The Globe and Mail & The Canadian Press*

Overview of a series of municipal oversight issues in Canada as of 2014. Article highlights more on lack of oversight than details of scandals. Included as a springboard source to learn about instances of unethical actions in municipal politics in Canada.

Jeremy Grimaldi, "[Former Vaughan mayor Michael DiBiase convicted of Municipal Act offence](#)" (6 February 2020) online: *The Star*

Overview of Michael DiBiase conflict of interest and procurement fraud allegations that led to him being charged (though the charges were eventually dropped) with municipal corruption and breach of trust under the Criminal Code and Ontario Municipal Act offenses.

Lawrence Ritchie, Kaeleigh Kuzma & Malcolm About (Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP), "[Whistleblowing in Canada](#)" (2 January 2019) online: *Lexology*

Overview of whistleblowing legislation in Canada, primarily at the federal level. Also touches on whistleblowing legislation for the securities regulators of Ontario and Quebec.

Les Perraux, "[Quebec’s anti-corruption crusade has resulted in many arrests but few convictions. Here’s what has happened so far](#)" (4 July 2018) online: *The Globe and Mail*

Overview of the actions taken by the Quebecois government and UPAC following the Charbonneau Commission and other anti-corruption investigations. Highlights some key

players and their legal status (arrested, convicted, not charged, etc.) as of the date of publishing.

Milos Barutciski (Borden Ladner Gervais), “[Snapshot: domestic bribery laws in Canada](#)” (12 March 2020) online: *Lexology*

Overview of Criminal Code provisions relating to bribery of public officials in Canada.

Sarah Chaster, “[Public Procurement and the Charbonneau Commission: Challenges in Preventing and Controlling Corruption](#)” (2018) 23 Appeal 121

Review of the Charbonneau Inquiry, detailing the inquiry itself, its recommendations, responses, and comparative perspectives.

Stanley Makuch & Matthew Schuman, “[Have We Legalized Corruption? The Impacts of Expanding Municipal Authority Without Safeguards in Toronto and Ontario](#)” (2016) 53:1 Osgood Hall Law Journal 301

Exploration of the expansion of municipal powers in Ontario and resultant behaviors that could be considered legitimized corruption, such as payments to secure zoning relaxations.

Suzanne Craig, “[Memorandum: Code of Conduct Complaint #0114 Investigation Report in Respect of Regional Councillor/Deputy Mayor Michael DiBiase](#)” (17 April 2015) online: *City of Vaughan*

Memorandum detailing allegations against Michael DiBiase. Issue #1 of memorandum referred to behaviors that were prima facie criminal and the city’s integrity commissioner, Suzanne Craig, advised the complaint be referred to the appropriate police service.

Case Law & Principles of Sentencing^{9,10,11}

Case Law – s.123 – Municipal Corruption

[R. v Bergevin](#), 2020 QCCA 658, [2020] JQ no 3876

[Judgment in French] Appeal of excavator’s conviction under s.123 for attempting to influence Mayor of Châteauguay, Québec. Issue on appeal is whether the municipal official being offered a bribe must accept offer for a conviction under s.123 (paras 40-51). Court discusses that acceptance by the official is not an essential element of the offense.

Court also discusses how *mens rea* of offense does not require an intent to benefit from the act of offering something to influence a municipal official.

[R. v Probe](#), 2018 SKQB 176, [2018] S.J. No. 247

⁹ Case law is organized in reverse chronological order to indicate timeline of precedent

¹⁰ For references to sections of Criminal Code, see [Canadian Legislation](#)

¹¹ Any cases that are not hyperlinked were not available on CanLII

Municipal official charged under s.122 and s.123(1)(c) for possible offering of vote switching or a forbearance on legal proceedings. Distinction between s.122 (Breach of Trust by public official) and s.123 discussed. Purpose of s.123 discussed, and elements of s.123 in current form are discussed at para 73.

[DiBiase v Vaughan \(City\)](#), 2016 ONSC 5620, [2016] O.J. No. 4822

Judgment on former Deputy Mayor and Vaughan, ON, Councillor Michael DiBiase's violations of the Municipal Act of Ontario. Though the case does not deal with charges under s.122 or s.123 of the Criminal Code, paras 194-221 speak to how the procedure of investigating an ethics violation under the Municipal Act may or may not turn into a criminal investigation.

[R. v Marcotte](#), 2015 QCCQ 7961, [2015] J.Q. no 23195

[[Judgment in French](#)] Decision on charges against 17 individuals relating to municipal corruption in Mascouche, Quebec, as part of the Charbonneau commission. Provides factual summary of scandal and overview of s.121, s.122, and s.123 to determine which can apply to municipal officials. Decisions against individuals listed in Paras 164-178.

[R. v Moodie and Vranich](#), 2010 ONSC 4847 [2010] O.J. No. 6033

Affirmation of *R v. Belzberg* and the concept that definitions of "office" and "official" under s.118 of the Criminal Code apply to s.123.

[Strudwick v Lee](#), 2007 SKCA 11, 289 Sask R 26

Civil proceeding for defamation, where the defamation was the respondent indicating that the plaintiff violated s.123. Purpose of s.123 stated that it "prohibits the payment of bribes to municipal officials".

R. v Leblanc, [1979] J.Q. no 449, [1979] C.A. 417

[[Judgment in French](#)] Quebec Court of Appeal judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada with a one-sentence judgment.¹² Court discusses the nature of corrupt acts, indicating that there does not have to be an intent to behave corruptly or illegally.

[R. v. Belzberg](#), [1962] S.C.R. 254, 131 C.C.C. 281

SCC decision wherein the court found that the definition of "office" or "official" in s.99 (now s.118) of the Criminal Code does not apply to s.104 (now s.123), the municipal corruption provision. The municipal corruption provision has its own definition of "municipal official" which precludes applicability.

[R. v Hall](#), 1961 CanLII 39 (ON CA)

Appeal of conviction of Toronto City Councillor and Reeve of York under s.104(1)(c) (now s.123(1)(c)) of Criminal Code. Individuals solicited a bribe in exchange for voting to

¹² [R. v Leblanc](#), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 344, [1982] S.C.J. No. 13

approve a building permit. Court discusses how there is a distinction between a legislative action (i.e. voting for a motion) and an administrative action as an element of the offense at para 17.

Principles of Sentencing – s.123¹³

[R v Bergevin](#), 2018 QCCQ 1662, [2018] J.Q. no 2097

[Judgment in French] Sentencing decision related to *R. v Bergevin* listed in section above. Bergevin was sentenced to a 2-year probation order with a condition of 240 hours of community service, and 3 compulsory donations of \$2,000 to local community organizations. Highlights denunciation as a principle in sentencing.

[R. v Accurso](#), 2018 QCCS 2900, [2018] J.Q. no 5861

[Judgment in French] Sentencing decision for Antonio (Tony) Accurso who was complicit in construction contract fraud, municipal corruption, and breach of trust. Addresses the appropriateness of compensation/restitution for criminal fraud. Analysis of restitution in paras 41-63, with sentencing decision and relevant personal factors discussed in paras 64-81.

[R. v Accurso](#), 2018 QCCA 1144, [2018] J.Q. no 6028

[Judgment in French] Judgment wherein Tony Accurso is released pending an appeal of his jury conviction and sentence. Court releases Tony while appeal is underway, and appeals process is still ongoing.¹⁴ Though no decision has been rendered, the case has been included for awareness of the ongoing appeal.

[R. v BPR Triax Inc.](#), 2017 QCCQ 4191, [2017] J.Q. no 6525

[Judgment in French] Sentencing decision for s.123 charges against BPR Triax, an engineering firm convicted under s.123 (2) for influencing a municipal official. Sentencing considerations are primarily outlined in paras 65-81. This is the sentencing decision for the corporate entity, where a fine is levied instead of a carceral sentence being ordered. See immediately below for the sentencing of the vice presidents.

[R. v de Maisonneuve](#), 2017 QCCQ 146, [2017] J.Q. no 6522

[Judgment in French] Sentencing decision for André de Maisonneuve and Rosaire Fontaine, vice presidents of BPR Triax (referred to in source above) who were convicted under s.123 (2). Speaks to joint sentencing recommendations and mitigating factors in sentencing.

[R. v Trudel](#), 2017 QCCQ 4190, [2017] J.Q. no 6524

¹³ Due to length of discussions in cases, principles themselves may not be specifically discussed but relevant paragraphs are identified

¹⁴ Factum filing deadline was May 20, 2020 as per *R. v Accurso*, 2020 QCCA 693, [2020 J.Q. no 3295]

[[Judgment in French](#)] Sentencing decision for Normand Trudel, who was convicted under s.123 (2) for illegal election contributions in Mascouche, Quebec. Highlights jurisprudence for sentencing of fraud and appropriate sentence in paras 59-79.¹⁵ Suitability of imprisonment in comparison to a community sentence is discussed in paras 80-97.

[Quebec \(Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions\) v Michaud](#), 2016 QCCQ 6209, [2016] J.Q. no 7732

[[Judgment in French](#)] Sentencing decision for France Michaud, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud (s.380) and municipal corruption (s.123). Provides a detailed overview of sentencing jurisprudence for convictions of municipal corruption,¹⁶ breach of trust by a public officer, and fraud against government in paras 25-71. Reasons for Michaud's sentence is described in paras 72-123 with sentence in paras 124-127.

[R. v Zambito](#), 2015 QCCQ 10999, [2015] J.Q. no 11911

[[Judgment in French](#)] Sentencing decision for Lino Zambito, who contributed to Boisbriand's electoral campaign for mayor in exchange for favours relating to contract provision. Analysis of sentencing principles in paras 11-45 and determination of sentence in paras 46-57.

[R. v Gyles](#), [2003] O.J. No. 6249, 2003 CarswellOnt 8036

Sentencing decision for a city councillor in Mississauga, who solicited/accepted bribes in exchange for favours and was convicted of breach of trust and municipal corruption. Case law analysis in paras 17-28, with particular emphasis on [R. v. Gentile](#), [1994] O.J. No. 4446 & [R. v. McKitka](#), [1982] B.C.J. No. 2258, 7 W.C.B. 527 (B.C.C.A.) as the offenders were a mayor and councillor respectively.

Case Law – s.122 – Breach of Trust by Public Officer

[R. v Boulanger](#), 2006 SCC 32, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 49¹⁷

A high-profile case on breach of trust by a public authority. Director of Public Security of Varennes, Quebec, charged with s.122 opposed to s.123. SCC discusses how “simple errors” and “errors of judgment” on the part of public officials are not inherently criminal. Court confirms that s.122 is applicable to municipal officials at para 6 and lays out specific elements of offense at para 58 with further elaborations throughout. Though it does not cite *R v Sheets*, it confirms its validity.

[R. v Probe](#), 2020 SKCA 5, [2020] S.J. No. 6

Appeal of acquittal for breach of trust and municipal corruption. Mens rea of breach of trust is discussed and at para 60, the court states that it is a specific intent offense. Court

¹⁵ Analyzing [R v de Maisonneuve](#) (listed), [R. v Zambito](#) (listed) as well as [R. v Corbeil](#), 2010 QCCA 1628, [2010] J.Q. no 9018 which deals with s.121 (Fraud on government)

¹⁶ The many cases discussed are for the most part not included in this bibliography as they are summarized within [Michaud](#)

¹⁷ Case listed out of order as it is the leading case establishing elements of Breach of Trust

discusses the notion that individuals can act for multiple purposes and if *any* one purpose for an action is against the public interest, as opposed to a specific one being alleged, the threshold for mens rea is met.

[R. v Bissonnette](#), 2018 QCCA 2165, [2018] JQ no 12102

[[Judgment in French](#)] Appeal of acquittal under s.122 for an individual that was party to a convicted municipal official's breach of trust. Court discusses the mens rea for breach of trust, noting that breach of trust does not necessarily need to be categorized as general or specific intent, so long as it is clear that the accused had the intent to do anything that is not in the public interest.

[R. v Brière](#), 2017 QCCA 1106, [2017] J.Q. no 9541

[[Judgment in French](#)] Appeal of conviction under s.122 for participating in scheme to ensure re-election of mayor of Boisbriand, Quebec, and her supporters. Identifies the difference between reasonable and criminal attempts to dissuade political opponents from electoral participation, with criminal attempts falling under s.122.

[R. v Brière](#), 2015 QCCQ 7959, [2015] J.Q. no 9773

[[Judgment in French](#)] Judgment against Brière for participation in a scheme to limit electoral competition in Boisbriand, Quebec. Confirms that an individual who is not a municipal official can be convicted as a party to breach of trust if they are involved in a conspiracy that itself qualifies as a breach of trust. In this case, the mayor's conspiracy to limit electoral competition. Unclear whether this extends to s.123.

[R. v Sheets](#), [1971] S.C.R. 614, 15 C.R.N.S. 232, 1 C.C.C. (2d) 508

Elected municipal official charged with s.103 (now s.122) – breach of trust. Supreme Court of Canada confirms an elected municipal official qualifies as an official as defined by s.99 (now s.118) in addition as a “municipal official” under s.104 (now s.123).

Principles of Sentencing – s.122¹⁸

[R. v Gingras](#), 2020 QCCS 748, [2020] J.Q. no 1460

[[Judgment in French](#)]: Sentencing decision for ex-mayor of Ville de L'Assomption. This case is unique as the accused did not personally misappropriate public money, but rather obstructed justice, illegally terminated employees, and granted contracts unlawfully in a way that created significant expenses for the city. Sentencing discussed in paras 276-349. *Thibault* applied for determining suitability of prison sentence.

[R. v Applebaum](#), 2017 QCCQ 2522, [2017] J.Q. no 748

[[Judgment in French](#)] Sentencing decision for mayor of a Montreal borough for fraud against government (s.121) and breach of trust (s.122). Provides an overview of sentences

¹⁸ Municipal corruption that is not assessed under s.123 is generally covered by s.122

against other mayors for fraud and breach of trust in paras 47-79 and compares with other government officials in paras 90-92.

[R. v Harbour](#), 2017 QCCA 204, [2017] J.Q. no 748

[Judgment in French] Appeal of sentencing decision for mayor of a Montreal borough who was convicted of fraud. Contains a significant review of case law relevant to sentencing in paras 30-49 that has significant overlap with breach of trust offenses, and *Thibault* (listed below) is distinguished.

[R. v Thibault](#), 2015 QCCQ 8190, [2015] J.Q. no 7306

[Judgment in French] Although the case concerns the lieutenant-governor of Québec, it establishes principles for when a prison sentence is appropriate for breach of trust that were applied, discussed and distinguished from fraud in *Harbour* (listed above) in paras 110-116.

[R. v Everitt](#), 2010 YKTC 91, [2010] Y.J. No. 106

Sentencing decision for mayor of Dawson City, who embezzled amounts totalling \$38,300. Considers Canadian sentencing principles as well as those heavily considered in the Yukon and discusses how the stigma associated with the crime carries a heavier weight in a smaller community where anonymity may be impossible.

[R. v Harvey](#), 2006 BCPC 444¹⁹

Sentencing decision for Mayor of Vernon, BC, who had been convicted of breach of trust for using his credit card for personal purposes. At the time of the case, there was limited jurisprudence on s.122 sentencing and at para 36 the court notes eight cases displaying the range of sentences and compares Harvey's case to those in paras 40-55 with the decision at para 56.

¹⁹ Though a BC Provincial Court case, it has been referred to in many provincial Superior Courts

International

General

A.J. Brown, David Lewis, Richard E. Moberly & Wim Vandekerckhove, eds, [International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research](#) (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2014)

Book of consolidated chapters on whistleblowing research with analysis from conceptual and practical standpoints. Geared towards policymakers and researchers. Though there is not a municipal focus, this resource was included because whistleblowing is agnostic to specific levels of government and can be applicable at the municipal level.

Andreas P. Kyriacou, Leonel Muinelo-Gallo & Oriol Roca-Sagalés, “[Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries](#)” (2015) 165:1/2 Public Choice 123

Analysis of the global construction industry and its relationship with corruption. Source included because many municipal corruption scandals are related to construction and contracts.²⁰

Anwar Shah et al, “[Local Public Infrastructure and Corruption](#)” in Brian Dollery et al, eds, [Local Public, Fiscal and Financial Governance: An International Perspective](#) (Berlin, DE: Springer, 2020)

Book chapter on the impacts of government decentralization on levels of corruption in local governments. Provides a review of existing research and debates on the topic while identifying arguments for the effects of decentralization and the limits of our current knowledge on the subject.

Clara Volintiru & Jose Javier Olivas Osuna, “[Preventing corruption at local and regional level in South Mediterranean countries](#)” (2018) [Research File for European Committee of the Regions]²¹

[From Summary] “This study identifies the main current vulnerabilities of local and regional authorities (LRAs) in Southern Mediterranean countries regarding public procurement and public services and provides a systematic assessment of priority avenues of intervention.”

Dieter Zinnbauer, “[Cities of Integrity: An Overlooked Challenge for Both Urbanists and Anti-Corruption Practitioners – And a Great Opportunity for Fresh Ideas and Alliances](#)” (2013) [Draft Working Paper] online: SSRN

Working paper discussing the gap between urban development practitioners and the anti-corruption community. Analyzes issues that result in and from the gap between the areas

²⁰ E.g. in Canada (Charbonneau Inquiry), Italy (mafia involvement in procurement), and Spain (Punica & Gurtel scandals)

²¹ Though commissioned by the Committee of the Regions, deals with countries in Northern Africa and Western Asia. Excluded from Europe section of bibliography as such.

of expertise and discusses why there needs to be a bridging of the two disciplines to be able to effectively deal with issues of corruption at the municipal level.

Dieter Zinnbauer, “[Corruption: Habitat III Agenda’s Elephant in the Room](#)” (01 February 2016) online: *Habitat International Coalition*

Brief article describing the need for increased attention to urban corruption, explaining why it was to be a significant part of the agenda of Habitat III, the [2016 United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development](#).

Dieter Zinnbauer, “[Urban land: a new type of resource curse?](#)” in Aled Williams & Philippe Le Billon, eds, *Corruption, Natural Resources and Development* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017)

Book chapter on how urban land has been commoditized and suffers from a ‘resource curse’. Discusses global urbanization, how property values have propped up individuals and corporations as well as municipal budgets (through speculative investments and property taxes) and related opportunities for corrupt behavior.

Francesco Chiodelli & Stefano Moroni, “[Corruption in land-use issues: a crucial challenge for planning theory and practice](#)” (2015) 86:4 *The Town Planning Review* 437

Exploration of corruption theory and how it relates to issues in land use and urban planning. Provides a brief overview of principles and strategies/tools used in the prevention of corruption in planning.

Francesco Chiodelli, Tim Hall & Ray Hudson, eds, [The Illicit and Illegal in Regional Urban Governance and Development](#) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017)

Comparative essay collection/book that looks to identify the nature of illegal/illicit activity and how it impacts urban development. Many chapters are focused on municipal corruption. Other chapters speak generally to the role of urban governments in the context of broader criminal endeavors.

Hamish A.D. Nixon et al, “[Local governance, decentralization and corruption in Bangladesh and Nigeria](#)” (2018) online: *Overseas Development Institute*

Noting that the developing world is experiencing high rates of governmental decentralization, theories surrounding the relationship between decentralization and corruption are explored using evidence from municipalities in Bangladesh and Nigeria.

Jens Ivo Engels et al, eds, [Stadt – Macht – Korruption](#) (*City – Power – Corruption*) (Germany: Steiner Verlag, 2017)

[Source in German] Book on municipal corruption through 1900 to the mid-20th century with chapters on cities around the world. European focus but has discussions on North America and Russia.

Jack Shenker, “[Which are the most corrupt cities in the world?](#)” (21 June 2016) online: *The Guardian*

News article detailing the prevalence of municipal corruption globally, highlighting how the issue is largely ignored within discussions of macro-level corruption, and how there is a lack of available research and data on the issue that create challenges in addressing the problem.

Kalin Ivanov, “Fighting Corruption Globally and Locally” in Raymond W. Cox, ed, [Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration: Concepts and Cases](#), 1st ed (New York, USA: Routledge, 2009) 155 at 169

Discussion of global perspectives of corruption including how different language is used in similar contexts and when dealing with interrelated problems. Discusses the need for harmonization of corruption-related concepts and language between international and local issues so that lawmakers and academics can assess and address issues effectively.

Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Frank Anechiarico & Frédérique E. Six, [Local Integrity Systems: World Cities Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity](#) (The Hague: BJU Legal Publishers, 2008).

[From Abstract] “This book is the first international comparative study of local integrity systems, paying attention to the policies, practices and actors [...] of the local integrity systems in seven world cities: Sydney, New York, Hong Kong, London, Hamburg, Amsterdam and Antwerp. For each city a description of the integrity system is given by the head of the key integrity agency, followed by an evaluation by an ethics researcher who is familiar with the city’s integrity system.”

Leo W.J.C. Huberts & Frédérique E. Six, “[Local Integrity Systems: Toward a Framework for Comparative Analysis and Assessment](#)” (2012) 12:2 Public Integrity 151

Further exploration of integrity systems in cities described in “Local Integrity Systems: World Cities Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity” (listed below). Emphasis placed on local government actors, the regulations that constrain them, and the effectiveness of integrity systems.

Mark Pyman, Dessi Hristova & Alan Doig,²² “[Sub-National Government Review](#)” (2018) online: *Curbing Corruption*

Broad overview of corruption at the sub-national government level (with a very clear emphasis on municipalities/local government). Provides background on corruption and discusses academic literature, case studies of countries and their municipalities, and provides practical steps for municipalities to approach anti-corruption strategies.

Odd-Helge Fjeltstad, “[Decentralisation and corruption: a review of the literature](#)” (2004) online: *UNESCO*

²² Other contributors not named

Review of literature on decentralization and relationship with corruption up until 2004; looks at impacts of expanded autonomy and powers of local governments on levels of corruption.

Peter Jones, "[Urban Governance and Its Disorders: Corruption in the Cities](#)" (2019) 14:2 *International Journal of Regional and Local History* 55

Introductory article to a special issue of the Journal on corruption in cities. Provides brief overview of municipal corruption and the articles included in the issue, some of which are cited in this bibliography.²³

Robert Klitgaard, Ronald Maclean-Abaroa & H. Lindsey Parris, "[Corrupt cities: a practical guide to cure and prevention](#)" (2000) online: *Institute for Contemporary Studies*

Cited in most papers on municipal corruption, this book provides a broad overview of determinants and outcomes of corruption at the municipal level and uses case studies from Hong Kong and La Paz, Bolivia, to illustrate.

Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre

"[Project Anti-Corruption System \(PACS\) – Overview](#)" (2020) online: *Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre*

Toolkit/system comprised of 12 individual standards designed to aid in the prevention and detection of corruption in construction and infrastructure projects. Geared towards any level of government that may be involved in construction contracts and adaptable to the municipal level.

OECD

"Corruption Prevention at Local Level in Eastern Europe and Central Asia" (2020) *OECD*²⁴

Review of anti-corruption efforts that originated at the local level across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, contextualized within a broader framework of regional and national level anti-corruption strategies.

"[OECD Foreign Bribery Report](#)" (2014) online: *OECD*

Summary of statistics from 427 foreign bribery cases and corresponding analysis. Not municipally focused but included because of statistics indicating proportion of foreign bribery cases involved municipal and local government officials.

"[OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement](#)" (2009) online: *OECD*

Overview of best practices and principles in public procurement with purpose of minimizing risk and actual occurrence of fraud and corruption. Not specifically geared

²³ Any sources from "14:2 *International Journal of Regional and Local History*"

²⁴ Paper is forthcoming

towards municipal corruption but a relevant source for best practices in public procurement, a significant amount of which happens at the local level.

Mat Tromme & Clara Volintiru, “[Corruption Risks at the Local Level in the EU and EU Periphery Countries](#)” paper prepared for OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum, 2018

Analysis of decentralization of governments in Europe with the objective of determining the risk factors for corruption at the local government level. Survey was conducted to identify risk factors with case studies analyzed. Comparisons of EU vs. non-EU states’ respective corruption risks also included.

Transparency International²⁵

“[Local Integrity Pacts](#)” (2020) online: *Transparency International*

Web page describing Local Integrity Pacts, a pilot initiative created by Transparency International wherein governments sign a document and publicly commit to transparent and integrity-based best practices in public procurement to prevent bribery and conflicts of interest. Initiatives in Greece, Latvia, and Lithuania have a municipal focus.²⁶

“[Learning Review: Transparency International’s Integrity Pacts for Public Procurement](#)” (2015) online: *Basel Institute on Governance*

Meta-study on results of global Integrity Pact implementations. Though not specifically discussed as an individual section, examples from Berlin, Buenos Aires, and Milan are referenced and included in data on efficacy of Integrity Pacts.

Andy McDevitt, “[Local Integrity System Assessment Toolkit](#)” (2014) online: *Transparency International*

Transparency International’s toolkit for assessing the governance and integrity structures of a local government. Intended to identify strengths and areas of improvement, allowing for tracking of effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives over time when implemented.²⁷

Jacqui de Gramont, “[Model Monitoring Agreement and Integrity Pact for Infrastructure: An implementation guide for civil society organizations](#)” (2018) online: *Transparency International*

Overview of life cycle of an Integrity Pact,²⁸ highlighting steps that are recommended for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that want to monitor public spending and procurement. Municipally focused but more relevant to parties seeking to hold government accountable.

²⁵ Any Transparency International reports that are region-specific are listed in that region’s respective section

²⁶ Documents on respective national Transparency International sites may be in local language, e.g. Greek site

²⁷ For applications of toolkit, please see sections on Senegal, Portugal, Kenya & Palestina

²⁸ See “Local Integrity Pacts” above for definition

Nuno Ferreira da Cruz & Michel Gary, “[Local Governance Integrity: Principles and Standards](#)” (2015) online: *Transparency International*

Transparency International’s ‘living document’²⁹ comprising up-to-date guidance on preventing and responding to corruption in local governance systems. It highlights principles and practices that underlie an effective approach to corruption mitigation for parties seeking to hold governments accountable.

UN

[New Urban Agenda](#) (adopted at United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), Quito, Ecuador, 20 October 2016 and endorsed by United Nations General Assembly, 23 December 2016)

Broad guidelines for UN member states to be able to approach urban development from the lens of sustainability and ethical behavior. Provides a series of recommendations, guidelines, and principles. See recommendations 138 and 151 of agenda for corruption-specific commitments.

Restore the Health of your Organisation – A Practical Guide to Curing and Preventing Corruption in Local Government and Communities [Volume 1 – Concepts and Strategies](#) & [Volume 2 – Process Facilitation Tools](#) (UN-HABITAT, 2006)

[From Guide] “At the local level in many countries, citizens groups are holding their governments to account. But change can also start from within the local government. [This guide ...] offers a hands-on capacity-building approach to restore the health of local governments, increase revenues and improve service delivery, reduce poverty and social exclusion, and uphold ethical standards and practices.”

Milena Minkova, “[Guide To Corruption-Free Local Government](#)” (2018) online: *United Nations Development Program*

[From Guide] “This guide is a practical instrument to assist local governments, UNDP Country Offices (COs), international organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) to design, implement and monitor anti-corruption at the local government level. This process includes 1) corruption risk assessments; 2) integrity plans; and 3) integrity management systems that result in more transparent, effective, efficient and accountable local governments.”

U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

Aled Williams & Kendra Dupuy, “[Corruption and the city: How aid donors can support integrity building in urban spaces](#)” (2018) online: *U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute*

²⁹ Last updated in 2015

Overview of modern urban corruption, highlighting government efforts to reduce corruption and providing recommendations for programs that third-party donors could support in efforts to reduce such corruption.

Dieter Zinnbauer, “[Towards cities of integrity: The role of urban planners](#)” (2019) online: *U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute*

Analysis of the role of urban planners as professionals and “process moderators” in relation to corruption and clientelism in urban development. Identifies ways for urban planners to contribute to effective governance and corruption prevention. Also contains links to news articles about planning corruption in India, China, USA, Kenya, Egypt, Bangladesh & Germany.

Dieter Zinnbauer, “[Urbanisation, informality, and corruption: Designing policies for integrity in the city](#)” (2020) online: *U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute*

[From Article] “New technologies offer opportunities to disrupt entrenched power networks, tackle corruption, and ease the precarious lives of city dwellers. We look at how anti-corruption policies should be designed and implemented in urban settings marked by high levels of informality.”

Iñaki Albisu Ardigó, “[Local government accountability mechanisms](#)” (2019) online: *U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute*

Review of principles of local government integrity and best practices relating to establishing accountability as a form of preventing corruption at the municipal level. Related resources and case studies discussed, with emphasis on digital tools used in prevention.

Jennifer Schöberlein, “[Lessons learned from anti-corruption efforts at municipal and city level](#)” (2019) online: *U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute*

Review of municipal corruption prevention best practices, particularly in public procurement and service delivery. While it reviews efforts in various cities globally, it has an emphasis on Ukraine.

North America

United States

[“A Report on Financial Fraud in the Emergency Benefits Check Disbursement Program at the New York City Human Resources Administration”](#) (2018) online: *New York City Department of Investigation*

Overview of investigation and charges laid against NYC Human Resources Administration employee Elaina Bauta for fraudulent misappropriation of over \$350,000 USD in emergency benefits cheques.

[“Reports to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section”](#) online: *United States Department of Justice*

Collection of reports to congress detailing cases of public corruption convictions, and conviction statistics from all levels of government, including local officials.³⁰

[“DOI Reports”](#)³¹ online: *New York City Department of Investigation*

Collection of investigative reports on criminal activities in New York City, including many examples of corrupt behavior by administrators and officials. Two such reports are included on the next page.

[“DOI report and recommendations on the Citywide Construction Fraud Task Force’s investigation of a procurement fraud scheme at the Department of Environmental Protection and other corruption schemes”](#) (2018) online: *New York City Department of Investigation*

Results of NYC investigation into procurement fraud which “included (1) a bribery scheme; (2) a Minority and Women Business Enterprises (MWBEs) scheme; and (3) a straw donor scheme.”

Cheol Liu, Tima T. Moldogaziev & John L. Mikesell, [“Corruption and State and Local Government Debt Expansion”](#) (2017) 77:5 Public Administration Review 681

Economic analysis of the impacts of corruption on public debt levels. Source is less about the nature and prevention of corruption but supports the need for anti-corruption measures.

Daniel Czitrom, [New York Exposed: The Gilded Age Police Scandal That Launched the Progressive Era](#) (Oxford University Press, 2016)

Historical analysis of corruption in New York City towards the end of the 19th century and the resultant major anti-corruption campaign centered around the NYPD.

³⁰ 2019 report has not been published at the time of writing

³¹ Two sample reports are included below in this section

Douglas D. Gransberg, “[Does Low Bid Award Facilitate Wrongdoing? US Implications of Quebec’s Charbonneau Commission Report](#)” (2020) 21:1 Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction

Review of Québec’s Charbonneau Inquiry and risk factors that exist independent of location or level of government, with the purpose of applying lessons to the United States. Emphasis is placed on a “devotion to low bid awards”, brain drain resulting in outsourcing, and environments that create opportunities for corrupt behavior.

Gustavo J. Bobonis, Luis R. Cámara Fuertes & Rainer Schwabe, “[Monitoring Corruptible Politicians](#)” (2016) 106:8 The American Economic Review 2371

Analysis of audits of Puerto Rican municipalities, their timing relative to elections, and the impact of audits on the election of corrupted/corruptible politicians. Recommendations on the timing of audits are made.

Jay S. Albanese, Kristine Artello & Linh Thi Nguyen, “[Distinguishing Corruption in Law and Practice: Empirically Separating Conviction Charges from Underlying Behaviors](#)” (2018) 21:1 Public Integrity 22

Quantitative analysis of criminal corruption convictions in the United States. Compares convictions to determine what schemes and behaviors underlie criminal corruption at different levels of government, with municipal statistics included.

John A Gardiner, [The politics of corruption: organized crime in an American city](#) (Russell Sage Foundation, 1970)

[From Description] “Discusses actual corrupt practices in one small city, showing both the mechanisms of corruption and the fundamental questions they raise, the answers to which will apply in many cities. He describes the background and conditions that made it possible for a local syndicate to take over an Eastern industrial center, Wincanton.”

John A Gardiner, “[Corruption and Reform in Land-Use and Building Regulation: Incentives and Disincentives](#)” in Martin Wachs, ed, *Ethics in Planning*, 1st ed, (New York: Routledge, 1985)

[From Description] “This chapter discusses the participation in corruption by officials and the persons and businesses they regulate in terms of the opportunities which are available for corruption and incentives to take advantage of those opportunities.”

Kartemquin Films, “[All the Queen’s Horses](#)” (9 August 2017) online: *YouTube*

Documentary film on corruption scandal in Dixon, Illinois, where comptroller Rita Crundwell embezzled \$53.8m USD. Incident believed to be largest case of municipal fraud in American history.

Kimberly L. Nelson & Whitney B. Afonso, “[Ethics by Design: The Impact of Form of Government on Municipal Corruption](#)” (2019) 79:4 Public Administration Review 591

Analysis of forms of local government (mayor-council and council-manager) to identify whether there are relationships between quantities of corruption convictions and forms of local government. Focuses on the USA between 1990 and 2010.

Robert M. Lombardo, “The causes of traditional organized crime” in Windle et al., eds, [Historical Perspectives on Organized Crime](#), 1st Ed (London, UK: Routledge, 2018) at 37

Historical analysis of organized crime and corruption in Chicago and New York, assessing the role of mafia groups and governance structures to determine causal factors in growth of organized crime with a primarily municipal context.

Paul Lagunes & Rongyao Huang, “[Saving Gotham: fighting corruption in New York City’s property tax system](#)” in Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Lagunes, eds, [Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State](#) (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015)

Analysis of property assessment fraud in New York City following the arrest of 18 assessors in 2002. Reviews bureaucratic corruption generally, describes NYC’s Department of Investigation’s powers and responsibilities, and provides an overview of property tax systems to contextualize 2002’s corruption.

The Fifth Estate, “[Small Town Shakedown](#)” (28 March 2014) online: *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*

CBC’s *The Fifth Estate* episode³² (and written summary) on corruption scandal in Dixon, Illinois, where comptroller Rita Crundwell embezzled \$53.8m USD.³³

Mexico

“[OECD Integrity Review of Coahuila, Mexico](#)” (2017) online: *OECD Public Governance Reviews*

[From Description] “This report provides recommendations to leverage the full potential of Coahuila’s Local Anti-corruption System by identifying weaknesses and areas for improvement. It provides a comprehensive assessment of the state’s integrity system, analyses efforts made to build a culture of integrity in the state public administration, as well as the extent to which Coahuila’s internal control and transparency mechanisms enable effective accountability.”

“[OECD Integrity Review of Mexico City: Upgrading the Local Anti-Corruption System](#)” (2017) online: *OECD Public Governance Reviews*

[From Description] “This report provides an assessment of Mexico City’s Local Anticorruption System (LACS). Based on international best practices and the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, the report reviews the institutional and co-ordination arrangements of the LACS; its regulatory framework; and the tools, programmes and processes necessary for a strategic approach to public integrity.”

³² Video may be geographically restricted to Canadian viewers

³³ This explores the same scandal as the previously listed documentary “All the Queen’s Horses”

Alberto Chong et al, "[Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight to Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification](#)" (2015) 77:1 The Journal of Politics 55

Retrospective analysis of voting trends in local government in Mexico, with discussions on the impact detected corruption has on voters. Information on an incumbent's corruption reduces their support but also causes people to exit from the political process instead of necessarily voting for the opposition.

Aldo F. Ponce, "[Violence and electoral competition: criminal organizations and municipal candidates in Mexico](#)" (2019) 22 Trends in Organized Crime 231

Analysis of drug trafficking organizations' impact on Mexican municipal elections, primarily in terms of the relationship between violence and the number of candidates. Touches on election financing but approaches corruption from the lens of candidate selection as opposed to candidate support.

Jerjes Aguirre Ochoa & Hugo Amador Herrera Torres, "[Local democracy, crime and violence in Mexico: The case of Apatzingán, Michoacán](#)" (2016) 11:22 Política Criminal 656

Case study of governance in Apatzingan, indicating the weaknesses of the institution that had allowed for corruption at the municipal level and corresponding recommendations to follow.

Jerjes Aguirre Ochoa & Hugo Amador Herrera Torres, "[Local Elections and Organised Crime: The case of Michoacán, Mexico](#)" (2019) 8:4 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 62

Assessment of systemic risk factors for corruption in Mexican politics and the nature of municipal elections as an opportunity for organized crime to legitimize itself and cement itself in government affairs.

Jerjes Aguirre Ochoa & Hugo Amador Herrera Torres, "[Municipal police and organized crime. The case of Michoacán, México](#)" (2019) 12:2 Quaestio Juris 225

Analysis of surveys and interviews from officials in six municipalities in Michoacán, with the objective of determining the nature and scope of organized crime within municipal affairs, particularly at the police level. Systemic issues contributing to prevalence of organized crime and practical recommendations are discussed.

Mario R. Arauz et al, "[Tackling corruption in urban development through open data and citizen empowerment: The case of "visor urbano" in Guadalajara](#)" (Paper delivered at International Smart Cities Conference, Wuxi, September 2017)

Conference paper on the implementation of the "Visor Urbano" platform in Guadalajara, Mexico. Visor Urbano is an online platform that facilitates the contracting and approvals process in relation to construction projects. It was implemented as an anti-corruption measure and paper assesses its features and effectiveness.

Europe

General

Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Governance Committee, CG, 31st Sess, Resolution 401, [Preventing corruption and promoting public ethics at local and regional levels](#) (2016)

Text of Resolution 401 and explanatory memorandum. Resolution concerns the adoption of an anti-corruption roadmap with objectives of providing reports on various kinds of corruption and unethical behavior that occur at the local level.

“[EU Anti-Corruption Report](#)” (2014) online: *European Commission*

Report on corruption-related issues and legislation in the 27 EU member states. Web page has links to country-specific chapters with high-level overviews of corruption issues, government structures, and legislation for each state. Many parts of the report are dedicated to municipal corruption. There are also links to fact sheets on general corruption statistics for individual EU states (which do not specifically relate to municipal corruption).

“[Strengthening Public Ethics and Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Toolkit for Public Authorities](#)” (2017) online: *Council of Europe Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform*

Toolkit designed by the Council of Europe which “helps local authorities to assess, ensure and improve public ethics where appropriate.” Includes general strategy recommendations as well as a scorecard to assess a city’s ethical infrastructure/anti-corruption measures.

“[Strengthening Public Ethics and Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Case Studies](#)” (2017) online: *Council of Europe Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform*

Case study analysis/application of Public Ethics Scorecard to local governments in Armenia, Spain, the Basque (independently assessed), Ukraine, and Moldova. Uses the scorecard from the toolkit listed above.

“[The role of local and regional authorities in preventing corruption and promoting good governance](#)”, background note delivered at Joint conference of the Committee of the Regions and the Congress (Council of Europe), 28 February 2017

Background note detailing the development of anti-corruption policy in Europe and the increased focus on local corruption prevention and related strategies in recent years.

Andreas P. Kyriacou & Oriol Roca-Sagalés, “[Does decentralizing public procurement affect the quality of governance? Evidence from local government in Europe](#)” (2020) *Local Government Studies*

Quantitative analysis of 30 European countries and the impacts of decentralization of public procurement on quality of governance, expenditures, rent-seeking, and risks of

exploitation/corruption while taking into account the varying levels of autonomy of local governments.

Clara Volintiru et al, "[Preventing Corruption and Promoting Public Ethics at the Local and Regional Level in Eastern Partnership Countries](#)" (2017) online: *European Committee of the Regions*

[From executive summary] "This study identifies the main current vulnerabilities of local and regional authorities (LRAs) in Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries regarding public procurement and public services, and provides a systematic assessment of priority avenues of intervention."

Julia Korosteleva, Tomasz Mickiewicz & Paulina Stepien-Baig, "[It takes two to tango: complementarity of bonding and bridging trust in alleviating corruption in cities](#)" (2018) 54:6 *Regional Studies* 851

Quantitative analysis of micro-level determinants of corruption at the local government level with conclusions on the impact of city size on corruption, as well as the roles of both institutional and community trust in preventing bribery.

Kathleen M. Dowley, "[Local government transparency in East Central Europe](#)" (2007) 32:5 *Local Government Studies* 563

Analysis of decentralization of municipal governments in post-communist East Central Europe with the aim of identifying societal factors that determine transparency of local governments to inform future research on the effectiveness of transparency models.

Philip Gounev & Tihomir Bezlov, "[Examining the links between organized crime and corruption](#)" (2013) online: *Center for the Study of Democracy*

Broad analysis of the relationship between organized crime and corruption in Europe. Not directed specifically towards municipal corruption, but it receives reasonable attention through examples and case studies.

Albania

Dalina Jashari, Shefqet Bruka & Mirsada Hallunaj, "[Challenges of Local Government Units in the Fight Against Corruption: An Assessment of the Anti-Corruption System in 20 Municipalities of Albania](#)" (2016) online: *Institute for Democracy and Mediation*

Following Albania's implementation of the "Crosscutting Anti-Corruption Strategy 2015-2020", this study assesses the state of anti-corruption efforts in Albanian local governments and makes suggestions to fill gaps in various anti-corruption systems.

Bosnia

Rodolfo Toè, “[Bosnia ‘Failing to Punish’ Election Law Violations](#)” (12 September 2016) online: *BalkanInsight*

News article detailing a lack of accountability for election law violations during the 2016 local government elections in Bosnia.

Bulgaria

Milana Krivachka, Eli Georgieva & Teodora Gandova, [Counteracting the Corruption in Local Authorities](#), (Sofia: Centre for Study of Democracy, 2000)

[Source in Bulgarian][From Description] “The reader contains Bulgarian experts' analysis with practical data about the legislative framework of local self-government, the opportunities of direct and indirect civic involvement, new forms of civic control applied in municipalities in local issues decision-making and combating corruption.”

Croatia

Vuk Vukovic, “[Corruption and re-election: how much can politicians steal before getting punished?](#)” (2020) 48:1 *Journal of Comparative Economics* 124

Analysis of corruption on re-election chances in Croatian local governments, using “suspicious patterns of public procurement allocations in local government as a proxy measurement of corruption, based on combining quantitative and qualitative evidence on corrupt practices in local government.”

Georgia

World Bank, “Decentralizing Municipal Services” in [Fighting Corruption in Public Services: Chronicling Georgia’s Reforms](#) (World Bank: 2012) at 83

Chapter from book on Georgia’s overall anti-corruption efforts focusing on the impacts of legal reform, which included a reduction from 1,110 to 67 municipalities, and local budgeting laws. Aim of reforms was to prevent embezzlement, procurement fraud, and bribery.

Germany

Rainier Hornung, “[Prosecution of Corruption: The Baden-Wurttemberg \(Germany\) Example](#)” (Transcript of address delivered at the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia Expert Seminar on “Effective Means of Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”, Bucharest, Romania, 20-22 October 2010)

High-level overview of corruption in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg with specific references to the German Criminal Code and what constitutes a public official using a municipal corruption case as an example.

Rainer Wanninger, “[The Integrity Pact – Support for Builders](#)” (2015) online: *Transparency International*

[Source in German] Overview of Berlin’s Integrity Pact structure and effectiveness in local construction projects.

Greece

Dimitris Batzilis, “[Electoral competition and corruption: Evidence from municipality audits in Greece](#)” (2019) 59 *International Review of Law and Economics* 13

Quantitative hypothesis testing of whether there are lower levels of corruption in municipalities that have higher levels of electoral competition in Greece. Study uses data from municipal audits to test.

Finland

Ari Salminen, Pitkänen & Lauri Heiskanen, “[Ethical codes in local government: the problem of gifting – Views of the Finnish Councillors](#)” (2016) 20:1 *Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration* 3

An exploration of ethical codes for municipal councilors in Finland. The article finds that councilors often operate without deference to the ethical code, particularly when determining what is or is not an acceptable gift. Though not strictly dealing with criminal corruption, the article explores how elected officials interpret and interact with drafted ethics policies.

France

Agence Française Anticorruption, “[Analysis – Survey on the prevention of local government corruption](#)” (2018) online: *Ministère de la Justice*

English version of French government’s report on local government corruption. Survey was conducted and includes all sectors of local government to determine nature and prevalence of municipal corruption in France. Designed to be a “state of play” document.

Myriam Savy, “[Open Data and the Fight Against Corruption in France](#)” (2017) online: *Transparency International*

Overview of open data policies in France with an emphasis on its role in transparency and corruption prevention. Not municipally focused but describes how French municipalities do not have data governance obligations like other levels of government.

Iceland

Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, “[Political Control and Perceptions of Corruption in Icelandic Local Government](#)” (2015) 11:1 *Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration* 1

Comparative study of Iceland's municipalities and the relationship between the amount of political control enjoyed by the mayor and the perceived prevalence of corruption. Iceland's cities have numerous organizational structures and these are contrasted within the study.

Italy

Alessio D'Amato, Massimiliano Mazzanti & Francesco Nicolli, "[Waste and organized crime in regional environments: How waste tariffs and the mafia affect waste management and disposal](#)" (2015) 41 *Resource and Energy Economics* 185

Econometric analysis on effectiveness of waste management systems and the impact that organized crime has on productive outputs of such a system.

Annamaria Nese & Roberta Troisi, "[Corruption among mayors: evidence from Italian court of cassation judgments](#)" (2019) 22 *Trends in Organized Crime* 298

Review of Italian court data and judicial proceedings that analyzes the role of mayors in organized crime-related judgments. Research indicates that mayors involved in organized crime are more involved in the execution than the planning of corruption.

Anna Rita Germani, Antonio Pergolizzi & Filippo Reganati, "Eco-mafia and environmental crime in Italy" in Toine Spapens et al., eds, [Green Crimes and Dirty Money](#), 1st Ed (London, UK: Routledge, 2018) at 42

Analysis of waste management corruption in Italy with a section on urban/municipal waste management and risk factors.

Antonio Tabucchi & Francesco Saverio Borelli, "[Italy – Corruption, Mass Media and the State](#)" (2002) online: *Institutul Cultural Român*

[From Description] [Source in Spanish] "A dialogue between the Italian writer Antonio Tabucchi and General Prosecutor of Milan, F. S. Borelli, former chief investigator and prosecutor in the «Mani Pulite» operations between 1992–1998. An analysis of the actual political and judicial system and of certain corrupted relations between economy and politics in Italy."³⁴

Francesco Chiodelli, "[The illicit side of urban development: Corruption and organized crime in the field of urban planning](#)" (2018) 56:8 *Urban Studies* 1611

[From Paper] "[Paper] conducts a detailed study on some recent instances of corruption in the field of urban planning in the municipality of Desio, close to Milan, Italy. [...] The analysis sheds light on the main issues at stake in corrupt transactions, the key public agents involved, and the stages of the planning process most vulnerable to corruption."

³⁴ Mani Pulite operations were what uncovered the extent of the *Tangentopoli* scandal referred to in sources above

Francesco Decarolis et al., “[Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting](#)” (2020) online: *SSRN*

Quantitative analysis of public procurement (72% of contracts being municipal) and the impact of an increase in discretionary contract auction procedures on the success of ‘investigated firms’ (firms that Spain’s FBI-equivalent has investigated for corruption) in obtaining contracts.

Gianmarco Daniele & Benny Geys, “[Organized Crime, Institutions and Political Quality: Empirical Evidence from Italian Municipalities](#)” (2015) 125:586 *The Economic Journal* F233

[From Abstract] “This article assesses how legal institutions affect the influence of politically active criminal organisations on the human capital of elected politicians using data from over 1,500 Southern Italian municipalities in the period 1985–2011. It exploits municipal government dissolutions imposed by the national government for (presumed) mafia infiltration as a source of exogenous variation in the presence of politically active criminal organisations.”

Gianmarco Daniele & Tommaso Giammoni, “[Corruption under Austerity](#)” (2020) BAFFI Carefin Centre Research Paper No. 2020-131

Assessment of the implementation of Domestic Stability Pacts (DSP) on levels of corruption in local governments in Italy. DSPs are spending/budgetary caps imposed on municipalities.

Ilaria de Angelis, Guide de Blasio & Lucia Rizzica, “[Lost in Corruption. Evidence from EU Funding to Southern Italy](#)” (2020) online: *Italian Economic Journal*

Quantitative analysis of financial transfers from the EU to Italian municipalities and the relationship between such transfers and the incidence of corruption at the local government level.

Marco Dugato, Francesco Calderoni & Gian Maria Campedelli, “[Measuring Organized Crime Presence at the Municipal Level](#)” (2020) 147 *Social Indicators Research* 237

Study proposing a Mafia Presence Index (MPI) as a quantitative measure which can explore the presence and nature of organized crime in municipal governments in Italy.

Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, “[Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources](#)” (2020) Working Paper, University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 04/WP/2020

Analysis of municipal expenditure categories and how infiltration of a local government by organized crime (the mafia in this case) impacts spending across these categories. For example, governments with higher levels of organized crime spend less on police and more on waste management.

Maria Laura Seguiti, “Global Versus Local Perspectives of Anticorruption Reforms in Italy” in Raymond W. Cox, ed, [*Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration: Concepts and Cases*](#), 1st ed (New York, USA: Routledge, 2009) 155

Description of Italy in the context of global corruption followed by an exploration of anti-corruption efforts, to deal particularly with mafia-related problems, including integrity pacts in cities such as Milan and Bergamo and other administrative and policy initiatives (and corresponding gaps/weaknesses).

Martin Rhodes, “[Tangentopoli – More than 20 Years On](#)” in Erik Jones & Gianfranco Pasquino, *The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 309

Retrospective analysis on the *Tangentopoli* (Bribesville) scandal of 1992 that started with municipal corruption in Milan and escalated into a national corruption scandal which brought down a national governing party. Explores modern corruption in Italy resulting from how the scandal played out.

R. Bologna & R. Del Nord, “[Effects of the law reforming public works contracts on the Italian building process](#)” (2000) 28:2 Building Research & Information 109

Overview of legislative reform in Italy following the Tangentopoli scandal of 1992 and its impact on the prevalence of corruption within the construction industry.

Sergio Galletta, “[Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy](#)” (2017) 101 Journal of Urban Economics 90

Analysis of effectiveness of interventions (and their spillover effects) in Italian municipalities that are intended to root out mafia influence, e.g. central government dismissing and replacing a city council that may be linked to the mafia.

Stefano Caneppele & Sara Martocchia, “[Italian Mafias, Public Procurement and Public Works in Southern Italy](#)” in *Organized Crime, corruption and crime prevention* (New York: Springer, 2013)

Analysis that uses the “crime script” method (a framework of how a crime is committed for preventive purposes) to evaluate how the mafia and other illicit actors in Southern Italy infiltrate government procurement processes. It only loosely refers to municipal/local corruption but contextualizes the nature of the corruption described in other sources.

Latvia

“[Corruption Risks in City-Managed Infrastructure Projects Offer Bitter Lessons](#)”, (11 June 2019) online: *Delna*

Delna's³⁵ post-hoc reflection on corruption scandal in public procurement in Riga. Delna withdrew from oversight after reporting concerns to legal authorities. Emphasis is placed on corruption being brought to light and publicized, even if not prevented.

“[Riga Mayor Usakovs removed from office by minister](#)” (5 April 2019) online: *Latvian Public Broadcasting*

Mayor removed by minister for role in the Rigas Satiksme corruption scandal. Discusses ministerial powers and their use in ensuring effective governance of Riga, Latvia's capital.

“[Rigas Satiksme Graft Case: What we know so far](#)” (19 February 2019) online: *Latvian Public Broadcasting*

Summary of bribery/corruption scandal in public procurement of Skantstes tram project in Riga, Latvia's capital. The Tram was subject to a Transparency International Integrity Pact that TI withdrew from after witnessing violations.

Macedonia

Bryane Michael & Stephen Mendes " [Anti-corruption law in local government: Legal issues related to ordinance-design and municipal-level anti-corruption agencies in Macedonia](#)" (2012) 54:1 *International Journal of Law and Management* 26

[From Abstract] “The purpose of this paper is to review the legal issues involved in drafting such ordinances and provide legal advisors to local councils with the legal and economic analysis needed to tackle some of the more difficult and detailed questions.”

Norway

“[Protect Your Municipality: An anti-corruption handbook](#)” (2014) online: *Transparency International Norway*

Overview of municipal corruption, with specific case studies from Norway explored. Provides a comprehensive background of issues, the policy mechanisms in place in Norway, and recommends anti-corruption practices that municipalities can adopt.

Francesco Kjellberg, “[Conflict of interest, corruption or \(simply\) scandals?](#)” (1995) 22 *Crime, Law & Social Change* 339

Analysis of public and administrative responses to corruption scandals in Oslo between 1989 and 1991 to determine whether the actions in question were truly corrupt, mere conflicts of interest, or sensationalized scandals. The three categories are not mutually exclusive nor exhaustive as the author discusses the nuances in terminology in more detail.

³⁵ Transparency International's Latvian Chapter

Marit Skivenes & Sissel C. Trygstad, "[Whistleblowing in Local Government: An Empirical Study of Contact Patterns and Whistleblowing in 20 Norwegian Municipalities](#)" (2016) 39:3 Scandinavian Political Studies 264

Article that explores the contact patterns between politicians and administration in Norwegian municipal governments and whether more or less contact has an impact on whistleblowing activities and the responses of politicians to whistleblowing.

Per Ole Johansen, "[His Own Empire: The Norwegian Waterworks Case](#)" (2012) 13:2 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 120

Paper exploring the history of the 'Waterworks' Scandal where the head of a municipal water treatment organization systematically embezzled tremendous amounts of wealth during the 1990s and 2000s.

Netherlands

Alain Hoekstra & Muel Kaptein, "[The Institutionalization of Integrity in Local Government](#)" (2014) 15:1 Public Integrity 5

Qualitative study comparing the integrity frameworks of different-sized municipal organizations in the Netherlands. Objective is to identify how municipal governments of different sizes can manage integrity systems effectively as well as identify shortcomings in practical application of such systems.

André van Montfort, Becir Ogric & Leo Huberts, "[The \(in\)completeness of local integrity systems, a cross-sectional study on municipal integrity systems for civil servants in the Netherlands](#)" (2018) 6:9 Archives of Business Research 70

Researchers surveyed 117 out of 380 Dutch municipalities to determine quantitatively how 'complete' local integrity systems are in the Netherlands. For this paper, local integrity systems are focused more on civil servants/unelected officers than elected councilors/mayors.

Niels Karsten, "[Not Biting the Hand that Feeds You: How Perverted Accountability Affects the Ethical Leadership of Dutch Mayors](#)" (2019) 21:1 Public Integrity 1

Interview-guided study of the legal framework that obligates Dutch Mayors to act against individuals in their governments who have committed integrity violations (including criminal acts) and how the structure of municipal government creates challenges in enforcement. The dual role of the mayor is emphasized: holding council accountable but also being held accountable by council.

Spain

"[Transparency Indexes of Municipalities](#)" (2017)³⁶ online: *Transparency International*

³⁶ Most recent publication is 2017, but 2014, 2012, 2010, 2009, and 2008 also on page

Transparency International's index of transparency ratings for Spanish municipalities. Included to contextualize source below.

Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves de Araujo & Francisca Tejedo-Romero, "[Local government transparency index: determinants of municipalities' rankings](#)" (2016) 29:4 International Journal of Public Sector Management 327³⁷

Analysis of results of the 2014 Transparency International Index of Municipalities in Spain, exploring factors linked to higher and lower transparency scores.

Bernardino Benito, María-Dolores Guillardamón & Francisco Bastida, "[Determinants of urban political corruption in local governments](#)" (2015) 63:3-4 Crime, Law and Social Change 191

Analysis of the relationships between several factors (transparency, politicians' salaries) and levels of municipal corruption in Spanish municipalities between 2000 and 2009.

Bernardino Benito et al, "[Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption? An empirical evidence](#)" (2018) 21:1 Spanish Accounting Review 19

Analysis of the wage levels and re-election strategies of incumbent politicians in Spain, seeking to make recommendations on how governments can consider compensation and term limit strategies to reduce local corruption.

Bernardino Benito et al, "[Do the illegal and legal rents of politicians affect municipal election outcomes? Empirical Evidence](#)" (2019) 45:4 Local Government Studies 546

Comparison of legal and illegal rent-seeking behaviors' impacts on voter perceptions and behaviors in Spanish municipal elections (145 municipalities), contrasting with other factors that voters may consider such as local economic wellbeing.

Eliška Drápalová & Fabricio Di Mascio, "[Islands of Good Government: Explaining Successful Corruption Control in Two Spanish Cities](#)" (2020) 8:2 Politics and Governance 128

Qualitative analysis of successful anti-corruption efforts in Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès, two Spanish towns in a region with relatively high levels of corruption. Emphasis is placed on administrative reform as a tool in combatting corruption.

Francisco Bastida et al, "[Corruption premium" on municipal borrowing cost: the case of Spanish Mayors](#)" (2019) 31:3 Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 392

Analysis of the relationship between municipal loan interest rates and the prevalence of municipal corruption in Spanish cities.

Fernando Jiménez, "[Building Boom and Political Corruption in Spain](#)" (2010) 14:3 South European Society and Politics 255

³⁷ Source listed non-alphabetically as it directly refers to TI Index of Municipalities, listed above

Analysis of urban planning policy, administrative deficiencies, and Spain's economic growth as factors in Spanish municipal corruption in the early to mid-2000s.³⁸

Fernando Jiménez, Manuel Villoria & Mónica García, "[Badly Designed Institutions, Informal Rules and Perverse Incentives: Local Government Corruption in Spain](#)" (2012) 10:4 *Lex Localis* 363

[From Abstract]: "This paper analyses the problem of corruption in the local government in Spain, where despite a complex and sophisticated set of local rules to ensure due process in town planning and urban development, a great number of corruption incidents have come to light. The explanation of this outcome rests in the combined effect of factors such as the bad design of both integrity rules and town planning policies, the relevance of informal institutions such as the patronage networks, and the existence of perverse incentives"

Fernando Jiménez, Mónica García-Quesada & Manuel Villoria, "[Integrity Systems, Values, and Expectations: Explaining Differences in the Extent of Corruption in Three Spanish Local Governments](#)" (2014) 37:2 *International Journal of Public Administration* 67

Comparison of the local integrity systems (LIS) of three Spanish municipalities and their impacts on local corruption. Findings indicate that differences in LIS nor citizen perceptions account for variations in corruption levels.

Javier Moreno Zacarés, "[The Iron Triangle of Urban Entrepreneurialism: The Political Economy of Urban Corruption in Spain](#)" (2020) online: *Antipode*³⁹

Analysis of corruption in Spain from the lens of urban entrepreneurialism, which looks at the sociopolitical factors responsible for urban growth and development. Considers interactions between the government, real estate industry, and other actors to illustrate how clientelist relationships result in fraud and corruption.

José Antonio Romero, "[Púnica corruption investigation extended to 12 city governments](#)" (20 August 2015) online: *El País*

Article detailing the expansion of the Operacion Púnica investigation into illegal bid-fixing in urban planning and public procurement in Spanish municipalities.

Mónica García-Quesada, Fernando Jiménez & Manuel Villoria, "[Can't control/won't control: opportunities and deterrents for local urban corruption in Lanzarote](#)" (2014) 63:1-2 *Crime, Law and Social Change* 1

From article: "This article examines the opportunities for urban corruption and the deterrents in place at the local level in Spain in order to unravel why the Spanish local level has been particularly vulnerable to malfeasance. It analyses the case of Lanzarote, the most eastern island in the archipelago of the Canaries."

³⁸ Púnica & Gürtel corruption scandals not included as they occurred later

³⁹ Presently online-only. To be published in a future issue of *Antipode*

Salvador Parrado, Carl Dahlström & Victor Lapuente, “[Mayors and Corruption in Spain: Same Rules, Different Outcomes](#)” (2018) 23:3 South European Society and Politics 303

Comparison of two Spanish municipalities – Valdemoro (involved in Púnica corruption scandal) and Torrelodones (uninvolved in corruption) – to practically apply theoretical ideas surrounding bureaucratic structures, independent bureaucrats (trustees), and their roles in curbing existing and preventing future corruption in public procurement.

Sam Edwards, “[Spain’s Watergate: inside the corruption scandal that changed a nation](#)” online: *The Guardian* (1 March 2019)

Overview of Spain’s “Gürtel” corruption scandal that embroiled all levels of government. There is a focus on municipal procurement corruption and contract fraud.

Sergi Ferrer, “[Responsibility attribution for corruption scandals](#)” (2020) 46:1 Local Government Studies 22

Analysis of voter responses to municipal corruption scandals using data from Spanish municipalities and local elections when mayors and executives faced criminal sanctions.

Virginia Lopez Rubio, “[Corruption in Spain – A Brief Analysis of High-Profile Cases and Spanish Authorities’ Efforts](#)” (2020) online: *Kroll*

Overview of Puníca, Gürtel, and Palau de la Música corruption scandals with embedded links to other external sources and subsequent legislative responses. Each scandal involved bribery in relation to securing municipal public work contracts.

Sweden

Andreas Bergh et al, [A clean house? Studies of Corruption in Sweden](#) (Lund, Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 2016)

Book assessing the nature and history of corruption in Sweden. Chapter 5 is geared specifically towards corruption in Swedish municipalities and uses qualitative analysis to identify patterns in municipal corruption in the country.

Andreas Bergh et al, “[Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability](#)” (2018) 21:3 Public Integrity 320

Analysis of risk created by municipal politicians having roles as board members of municipally owned enterprises. Discusses perceived conflicts of interest that may be indicative of underlying corrupt behavior, or the risk of future corrupt behavior.

Barbara Czarniawska, “[Corruption or Ninteneen-Eighty Four?](#)” (2015) 19:3 Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration 3

Case study detailing corruption and bribery in the city of Gothenburg. Situates occurrences of corruption within the context of broader current events both in Sweden and internationally.

Gissur O. Erlingsson, Andreas Bergh & Mats Sjölin, “[Public Corruption in Swedish Municipalities – Trouble Looming on the Horizon?](#)” (2008) 24:5 *Local Government Studies* 595

Analysis of municipal political developments and New Public Management (NPM) oriented reforms following corruption in the 1990s that have contributed to an increase in corruption risk and a need for further investigation. Whistleblower prevalence, conversion of public authorities to independent companies, freedom of information, and municipal audits discussed.

Portugal

Nuno Ferreira da Cruz & Luís de Sousa, “[Local Integrity System Assessment: Portugal | Lisboa & Braga](#)” (2014) online: *Transparency International*

Transparency International’s report on pilot application of Local Integrity Systems toolkit in Lisboa & Braga, Portugal. Identifies strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities in addressing corruption and integrity issues.

Russia

“[The Battle Against Corruption at the Municipal Level](#)” (2015) online: *Robert Bosch Stiftung*

To assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures, the German city of Stuttgart conducted a study in Otradnyj, Russia. A list of measures and their success is evaluated to identify corruption-related issues.

Alieva G. Alladinovna, “[Correlation Between Corruption and Economic Crimes in Housing and Communal Services](#)” (2016) 62:2 *Ekonomika* 15

Examines the nature of fraud and corruption in Russian municipal housing authority procurement processes and fund allocation.

Hugo Flavier, Irina Chikireva & Kseniya Ivanova, “[Disciplinary Responsibility’s Application to the Local Government Employees Violating the Anti-Corruption Legislation in the Russian Federation, Europe, and the United States of America](#)” (2017) 4:4 *BRICS LJ* 116

Comparative paper that looks at municipal corruption in the context of anti-corruption laws and efforts in Russia, and analyses the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations for the country. It conducts a comparative analysis on anti-corruption efforts, laws, and punishments in the US, France, and Canada among others in relation to Russia.

Irina A. Damm et al, “[Anti-Corruption Potential of Openness and Accessibility of Municipal Legal Acts](#)” (2019) 12:3 Journal of Siberian Federal University, Humanities and Social Sciences 378

Study assessing the possible anti-corruptive efficacy of a digital platform facilitating access to municipal legislation for both the public and municipal officials. Discusses legal basis for storage and sharing of legislation (regulations emphasized).

Irina P. Chikireva & Galina A. Nelaeva, “[Russia-GRECO Cooperation: Combatting Corruption in the Field of State and Municipal Service](#)” (2017) 4:1 Journal for International and European Law, Economics and Market Integrations 69

Examination of Russia’s adoption of anti-corruption strategies as part of its involvement with GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption). Source is not exclusively municipally focused, but strategies apply to municipal governments, and some are specifically discussed.

Maxim Mironov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “[Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data](#)” (2016) 8:2 American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 287

Using data on illegal financial transactions related to municipal procurement around local/regional election time, the paper discusses the nature of Russian procurement fraud and its role in elections.

Noah Buckley et al, “[Staying Out of Trouble: Criminal Cases Against Russian Mayors](#)” (2020) Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation #2013

Using a dataset on arrests of municipal politicians in Russia, the paper analyzes factors that may insulate politicians from risk of being arrested. Premise of arrests is often anti-corruption, and paper also explores possible ulterior motives for the arrests (notwithstanding that a crime must have been committed).

Ukraine

“[You Can Now Get Rich Illegally in Ukraine. What does this mean?](#)” (3 March 2019) online: *Hromadske International*

News article detailing Ukrainian Constitutional Court’s decision to render Article 368-2 of their Criminal Code, on unjust enrichment, void. Provides brief details on reasoning, impact, and EU reaction.

National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, News Release, “[All cases as of facts of illegal enrichment are terminated due to the decision of the Constitutional Court](#)” (3 March 2019)

Release detailing a decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court on Article 368-2 of their Criminal Code, which dealt with unjust enrichment. Provision was found unconstitutional

and investigations and municipal corruption prosecutions relating to enrichment of upwards of 500m Ukrainian hryvnia were dropped.

News Releases Tagged: "[Odesa City Mayor](#)" (N/A) online: *National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine*

Collection of releases and notices by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), on the corruption scandals and unjust enrichment of the mayor of Odesa under articles 366-1 (criminal liability for declaring false information) and 368-2⁴⁰ (unjust enrichment) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Sophie Brown, "[Overhauling Ukraine's corrupt contracting sector](#)" (28 Nov 2016) online: *Medium*

News article detailing Ukraine's ProZorro open-data-based procurement system and the impact it had on reducing corruption and reducing government expenditure. Following its pilot, in 2016 the Ukrainian government mandated all government contracting to be done on ProZorro. Resource is less municipally focused but applicable to municipal procurement.

United Kingdom

"[Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally Strategy for 2020](#)" online: *Cifas*

Created in partnership with local governments in the United Kingdom, the report provides a broad strategic framework of how corruption can be prevented and responded to at the local level. Report is published/updated every four years.⁴¹

Alan Doig, "[Roadworks Ahead? Addressing Fraud, Corruption and Conflict of Interest in English Local Government](#)" (2014) 40:5 *Local Government Studies* 670

Paper summarizing local-level law reforms in England followed by analysis of current strategies, including the *Fighting Fraud Locally* strategy (cited above), and the capacity for councils to implement or adhere to ethical governance.

Andy Asquith, "[A bullock, a monkey and Robocop: an assessment of the directly elected mayor in English local government](#)" (2008) 36:1 *Policy & Politics* 39

Review of the process by which England introduced directly elected mayors. Source focuses less on criminal/corruption components and more on procedure and methods but remains as a valuable context for other analyses.

Elizabeth J. Fayerer-Jones, "[Make Him an Offer He Can't Refuse': Corruption, Coercion and Aristocratic Landowners in Nineteenth-century, Urban Wales](#)" (2019) 14:2 *International Journal of Regional and Local History* 62

⁴⁰ See two proceeding sources (NABU & Hromadske) on 368-2 being declared unconstitutional, as unjust enrichment investigation against mayor was closed separately

⁴¹ Prior versions can be found on the *Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy website*.

Historical analysis of the second Marquess of Bute and sixth Duke of Beaufort's use of corruption to develop and maintain control of the development of Cardiff and Usk in Wales.

Janice Morphet, "Councillors, Standards, and Corruption" in [*Modern Local Government*](#) (London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008) at 86

Book chapter that reviews local governance reforms and policy instruments on corruption in England from 1997 until publication. Post-1997 reforms had an objective of reducing corruption in local councils.

John Smith, ed, [*Corruption in Urban Politics and Society, Britain 1780-1950*](#) (London, UK: Routledge, 2017)

[From Abstract] "This volume places [issues of ethical standards] into their historical perspective by examining the linkages between processes of 'modernisation', urbanisation and the ethical standards of governance and public life. It considers how ethical debates arise as a result of differential access to positions of authority and from competition for public resources."

Nicolas Lord et al, "[Implementing a divergent response? The UK approach to bribery in international and domestic contexts](#)" 2020 20:5 Public Money & Management 349

[From Abstract] "[This paper argues] that in both domestic and international contexts, cases are not numerically significant but that changes in how the UK government approaches bribery in the international context means that, where once domestic bribery was addressed more rigorously than bribery in the international context, this imbalance may be being steadily reversed."

Peter Jones, [*From virtue to venality: Corruption in the city*](#) (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2016)

Book on historical corruption in 20th century United Kingdom at the local government level with emphasis placed on Glasgow, Westminster, and London. Connects national-level politics and party identification (labour vs conservative) to the local level and seeks to explain related vulnerabilities to corruption.

Richard Cowell, James Downe & Karen Morgan, "[Managing Politics? Ethics Regulation and Conflicting Conceptions of "Good Conduct"](#)" (2013) 74:1 Public Administration Review 29

Study of local politicians' reactions to changes in ethics governance in the UK, and where resistance exists. Considers the behaviors of politicians in response to changes intended to curb unethical behavior. Though not focused on criminal corruption, the study provides insight into how politicians respond to policy that impacts their behavior and choices.

Rodney Brooke, "[Corruption in Local Government – some ethical issues of the last twenty-five years](#)" in Chapman, ed, [Ethics in Public Service for the New Millenium](#) (London, UK: Routledge, 2000)

Historical review of 20th century corruption scandals in England, leading to the need for local governance reform.

South America

Argentina

Rafael di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, "[The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires](#)" (2003) 46:1 *The Journal of Law & Economics* 269

Analysis of whether or not high wages combined with a risk of auditing, the "Becker-Stigler model", contributed to reductions in corruption in Buenos Aires' hospital supply procurement.

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, [Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy](#) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)

Book that analyzes the prevalence of clientelism in Argentina across all levels of government, with many examples at the municipal and local level. Chapter 5 is titled "Clientelism across Municipalities in Argentina's National Food Security Program".

Brazil

Ana Luiza Melo Aranha, "[Accountability, Corruption, and Local Government: Mapping the Control Steps](#)" (2017) 11:2 *Brazilian Political Science Review* 1

[From Abstract] "The central purpose of this paper is to map out the Brazilian web of accountability institutions and observe how institutions establish links with each other in order to control corruption cases [emerging from audits of fund transfers to municipalities] that reach them."

Bianca Vaz Mondo, "[Measuring Political Corruption from Audit Results: A New Panel of Brazilian Municipalities](#)" (2016) 22:3 *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 477

Study challenging conventional research methods for quantifying corruption. It aims to construct an indicator for levels of corruption based on the results of municipal audits in 140 Brazilian municipalities between 1997 and 2013.

Carlos Pereira, Marcus André Melo and Carlos Mauricio Figueredo, "[The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives? Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil's audit reports](#)" (2008) 62:4 *Political Research Quarterly* 731

Study that uses municipal audit data to determine whether the timing of corrupt behavior impacts re-election chances in order to explore when politicians may be likely to engage in rent-seeking behavior.

Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, "[Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes](#)" (2008) 123:2 *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 703

Paper assessing municipal politicians' likelihood of re-election following random audits of their cities' finances. Explores the idea that exposing corrupt behavior reduces re-election chances.

Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, "[Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments](#)" (2011) 101:4 *American Economic Review* 1274

Comparison of election results in Brazilian municipalities that have varying levels of both reelection incentives and likelihood of judicial punishment for corruption. Resultant political behaviors, such as a lack or presence of corruption, are assessed.

Elliott Ash, Sergio Galletta & Tommaso Giommoni, "[A Machine Learning Approach to Analyze and Support Anti-Corruption Policy](#)" (2020) online: SSRN

Assessment of Brazil's municipal audit initiatives, and how inclusion of machine learning into audit process (to guide audits as opposed to having them be done on randomized municipalities) can improve corruption detection rates.

Eric Avis, Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, "[Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians](#)" (2018) 126:5 *Journal of Political Economy* 1912

Examination of Brazil's auditing of municipalities to determine the causal relationship between levels of corruption and the timing/presence of audits.

F. Daniel Hidalgo & Simeon Nichter, "[Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism](#)" (2016) 60:2 *American Journal of Political Science* 436

[From Abstract] "Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and it offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil."

Frederico Finan & Claudio Ferraz, "[Reelection Incentives and Political Corruption: Evidence from Brazilian Audit Reports](#)" (Paper delivered at American Agricultural Economics Association AGM, July 2005)

Investigation of the impacts of term limits on the level of corrupt mayoral behaviors in Brazil. Mayors have a two-term limit in Brazil, and among other factors, authors analyze whether behavior in a first term, where re-election is possible, is less corrupt than behavior in a second term, where re-election is impossible.

Ridwan Karim, "[Voter-Buying, Electoral Reform and Public Good Provision in Brazil](#)" (2019) online: *University of Toronto, Proquest Dissertations Publishing*

Dissertation studying 2007 election reform in Brazil and its impact on municipalities. Reform established to prevent electoral fraud by bringing in voters from outside electorates. Emphasis is on reform's impacts on electoral competition, vote buying, and corresponding effects on the provision of social services in Brazilian municipalities.

Colombia

Alan Gilbert, "[Corruption in Urban Latin America: The Case of Bogotá](#)" (2019) 14:2 International Journal of Regional and Local History 126

Case study of corruption in the city of Bogotá which is recognized as one of the exemplar cities in Latin America. Analysis of anti-corruption efforts in 1990s into 2000s, their impacts/efficacy, weaknesses, and what present day corruption in Bogotá may mean for other cities.

Eduardo Moncada, [Cities, Business, and the Politics of Urban Violence in Latin America](#) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016)

Overview of urban violence, political systems, and the role of corruption, clientelism, and organized crime in Latin America using examples from Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá (all Colombia). Emphasis is on the role of mayors and methods of securing power.

Miguel R. Rueda, "[Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring](#)" (2017) 61:1 American Journal of Political Science 163

Analysis of vote-buying mechanisms in municipal elections in Colombia. Emphasis is placed on how individuals/brokers bribing voters can monitor and enforce their bribes despite having no ability to verify who a citizen has voted for.

Sophie Brown & George Neumann, "[How open contracting helped fix Colombia's biggest school meal program](#)" (9 April 2018) online: *Medium*

News article providing an overview of school meal price fixing scandals in Colombia. The article indicates how the city of Bogotá's education secretariats worked with higher levels of government and used open data in public procurement to expose and resolve corruption issues.

Nicaragua

Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos et al, "[Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua](#)" (2012) 56:1 American Journal of Political Science 202

Quantitative study exploring the prevalence of vote-buying in the 2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections, estimating that 24% of registered voters were offered something in consideration for their vote.

Asia

China

Dongfang Chen, “[Legal Control Paths for Corruption of China’s Rural Cadres](#)” (2018) 10:8 Asian Agricultural Research 40

Two-page note summarizing China’s criminal law provision on rural cadre corruption and its shortcomings in curbing such corruption.

Feng Deng, “[Anti-corruption in Chinese urban planning: The case of adjusting FAR](#)” (2017) 70 Cities 65

Study of Floor Area Ratio (FAR)⁴² and how data relating to FAR can identify or screen cases of corruption. It also explores strategies that can help address issues relating to using FAR adjustments as an anti-corruption tool.

Guohui Wang, [Tamed Village “Democracy”: Elections, Governance and Clientelism in a Contemporary Chinese Village](#) (Berlin, DE: Springer, 2014)

Book analyzing structures and behaviors in local governance in Xinjia Township. Descriptive analysis resulting from the review of local governance structures and interviews with politicians and local citizens.

Shuai Wu & Tom Christensen, “[Corruption and Accountability in China’s Rural Poverty Governance: Main Features from Village and Township Cadres](#)” (2020) International Journal of Public Administration

Analysis of corruption in villages and townships in China, analyzing the prevalence and forms of corruption (i.e. group vs. individual) that impacted rural municipalities between 2016 and 2018, particularly in the realm of poverty governance. It describes specific cases and the accountability structures in place to try and prevent or respond to corruption.

The People’s Republic of China, News Release, “[Anti-graft drive wins public satisfaction](#)” (9 October 2017) online: *The State Council*

State announcement regarding success of anti-corruption efforts between 2012 and 2017. It provides Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) statistics on actions taken against municipal (village/township) officials.

The People’s Republic of China, News Release, “[Premier stresses strict supervision of new funds](#)” (1 June 2020) online: *The State Council*

State announcement outlining national-level government objective to provide poverty relief funds to local governments, and discussion of plans to ensure that the money is not embezzled or used fraudulently.

⁴² FAR = $\frac{\text{Total Floor Area}}{\text{Total Land Area}}$ with limits in local zoning guidelines

Ting Chen & James Kai-sing Kung, “[Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market](#)” (2019) 134:1 *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 185

Review of the success of China’s anti-corruption initiatives relating to corruption in land sales at the local government level. Details the nature of corrupt land sale transactions, the efficacy of interventions, and the relationships between local politicians and politburo elites by exploring data on land transactions.

Ting Gong, “[Corruption and local governance: the double identity of Chinese local governments in market reform](#)” (2006) 19:1 *The Pacific Review* 85

Analysis of the dual role of Chinese local governments focused on two common forms of corruption: illegal land transfers and illegal use of off-budget funds (termed ‘little money lockers’ in paper). Dual roles signify that local governments are both an arm of the state and principals of local economic needs.

Ting Gong, “[Managing Government Integrity under Hierarchy: anti-corruption efforts in local China](#)” (2014) 24:94 *Journal of Contemporary China* 684

Analysis of anti-corruption efforts at the municipal/cadre level in Guangdong, China following increases in corruption despite the introduction of regulatory frameworks meant to curb corrupt practices.

Xuguang Song & Wenhao Cheng, “[Perception of Corruption in 36 Major Chinese Cities: Based on Survey of 1642 Experts](#)” (2012) 109:2 *Social Indicators Research* 211

Analysis of cross-regional survey results assessing perceived levels of corruption in various Chinese cities, with analysis of corruption-prone sectors (e.g. construction), social factors concerning corruption, and efficacy of anti-corruption efforts.⁴³

Hong Kong⁴⁴

“[Anti-Corruption Resources](#)” online: *Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)*

Compiled resources for officials and civil servants that includes relevant Hong Kong anti-corruption policy, notes to district council members, a web learning portal on integrity management, and a reference package for conflicts of interest.

Emmanuel Kingsford Owusu et al, “[Towards corruption-free cities: Measuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in infrastructure project procurement and management in Hong Kong](#)” (2020) 96 *Cities* 102435⁴⁵

Computational analysis of 26 anti-corruption measures that have been put in place in Hong Kong, specifically in procurement for infrastructure projects. Evaluates their effectiveness

⁴³ Study released prior to recent CCP anti-corruption efforts.

⁴⁴ Hong Kong occupies a unique status as a municipality/state so any infrastructure related corruption has a necessarily ‘municipal’ element even if not explicitly stated

⁴⁵ Article No. as opposed to Page No.

and provides recommendations on how stakeholders can improve existing or implement new anti-corruption measures.

Ian Scott, "[Institutional Design and Corruption Prevention in Hong Kong](#)" (2012) 22:79 *Journal of Contemporary China* 77

Analysis of Hong Kong's anti-corruption strategies and whether it is possible for a rule-based system to succeed in preventing corruption without certain preconditions being met.

Ian Scott, "[Public Ethics and Corruption in Hong Kong](#)" in Evan M. Berman, ed, *Public Administration in Southeast Asia – Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao* (New York: Routledge, 2017)

Book chapter exploring the mandate, structure, and actions of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). It explores the intersection between ethical public service and corruption, and strategies ICAC uses to combat corruption (e.g. by using the word "advantage" tactically in legislation and educational resources).

Ian Scott & Ting Gong, [Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong](#), 1st ed (London, UK: Routledge, 2018)

Examination of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) work and actions taken to combat corruption, including details on the organization's historical background, case studies, and organizational structure. Details the relationship between corruption prevention and governance, challenges in responding to and preventing corruption, and the broader role of anti-corruption organizations such as ICAC.

Li Li & T. Wing Lo, "[Mainlandization, the ICAC, and the Seriousness Attached by Local Politicians to Corruption in Post-1997 Hong Kong](#)" (2017) 62:6 *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 1742

Paper focused on the impact of a growing Chinese political influence on politicians in Hong Kong as it pertains to corrupt behavior, following the Handover of Hong Kong in 1997. It finds the symbolic anti-corruptive value of ICAC has decreased and the seriousness of corruption has lessened over time post-1997.⁴⁶

Max J. Skidmore, "[Promise and Peril in Combating Corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC](#)" (1996) 547 *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 118

Analysis of ICAC's history, successes, and opportunities. The scope of the organization's powers and risks related to exercise of said power is discussed as well.

Ting Gong & Shiru Wang, "[Indicators and Implications of Zero Tolerance of Corruption: The Case of Hong Kong](#)" (2013) 112:3 *Social Indicators Research* 569

Study evaluating Hong Kong's culture of low tolerance for corrupt behavior. It examines how the public of Hong Kong has responded to ICAC initiatives and educational initiatives.

⁴⁶ Source may be of note considering the current political climate in Hong Kong

Not directly related to criminal corruption but included as it helps evaluate how anti-corruption and ethical norms can help reduce the prevalence of corruption.

Indonesia

Anisah Alfada, "[Does Fiscal Decentralization Encourage Corruption in Local Governments? Evidence from Indonesia](#)" (2019) 12:3 Journal of Risk and Financial Management 1

Indonesia's government decentralized to address corruption in 2001. This paper assesses the impact of this decentralization on the prevalence of corruption in local governments using data from the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission.

Benjamin A. Olken, "[Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia](#)" (2007) 115:2 Journal of Political Economy 200

Study of the impact of community level/grassroots involvement on levels of corruption in local politics and procurement. 608 Indonesian villages that were starting local roadworks project were studied with the independent variable being the different means of community involvement. Missing expenditures (actual spending compared to professional estimates) used as measure of corruption.

J. Vernon Henderson & Ari Kuncoro, "[Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia: The role of Islamic Parties](#)" (2011) 94:2 Journal of Development Economics 164

[From Abstract] "Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. This paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies."

Sabungan Sibarani, "[Effort of Medan Mayor in Realizing Clean Government \(Study About the Practice of Administration in Medan City to Prevent and Acts Criminal Actors of Corruption\)](#)" (2017) 5:2 Jurnal Cita Hukum 363

[Source in Indonesian] Analysis of efforts by the mayor in Medan, Indonesia to reduce levels of corruption in their municipal government.

Wu-Ling Chong, "[Local Politics and Chinese-Indonesian Business in Post-Suharto Era](#)" (2015) 4:3 Southeast Asian Studies 487-532

Paper exploring the role of Chinese businesspeople in Indonesia and the prevalence of corrupt business practices that ensnare local politicians in organized crime.

India

"[Bribe Trends – Municipal Services](#)" online: *I Paid a Bribe*

I Paid a Bribe is an online tool where Indian citizens can self-report instances where they were asked to pay a bribe or did pay a bribe to a member of government. Linked URL is to trends dashboard with statistics on bribes relating to municipal services. Data broken

down by form of transaction wherein the bribe was requested or paid (e.g. Housing Plan Approval or New Business License).

Arild Engelsen Ruud, "[Corruption as Everyday Practice. The Public-Private Divide in Local Indian Society](#)" (2011) 27:2 Forum for Development Studies 271

Ethnographic analysis of corruption-related behaviors in citizens and local governments in West Bengal, India. Analyzes the overlap and distinctions between standard moral practice (i.e. supporting family) and true corruption, as well as how bribery or embezzlement permeate local dealings.

Clarinda Still & Srinivas Dusi, "[Vote buying and 'Money-Politics' in village elections in South India](#)" (2020) 58:1 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 100

From paper: "We look at how [vote buying] is understood by voters themselves, party workers and local politicians, and what it reflects about voters' perceptions of politics in general at the local level."

Liza Weinstein, "[Mumbai's Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development](#)" (2008) 32:1 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 22

Review of the city of Mumbai's development boom from the 1990s onwards and the encroachment of existing organized crime into development activities. Examination of the factors that led to the involvement of criminal actors and high levels of corruption in construction and planning.

Jayaraj Sundaresan, "[Urban planning in vernacular governance: Land use planning and violations in Bangalore, India](#)" (2019) 127 Progress in Planning 1

Analysis of Bengaluru/Bangalore's planning regime, and how it responds to planning violations. Explores endemic corruption in local politics in Bangalore and how planning violations or zoning changes for the purpose of rent-seeking are a core part of the development industry.

Nicholas Martin, "[Enforcing political loyalties in local elections: an ethnographic account from Punjab](#)" (2019) 58:1 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 63

Paper analyzing methods by which local political parties monitor and enforce allegiances in relation to local elections, as well as methods of coercing residents to vote in a particular way.

Sapana Doshi & Malini Ranganathan, "[Contesting the Unethical City: Land Dispossession and Corruption Narratives in Urban India](#)" (2016) 107:1 Annals of the American Association of Geographers 183

Review of ethnographies on the discourse of corruption in India, with an emphasis on the cities of Mumbai and Bangalore. It explores the nature of corruption related to 'land grabs' in urban development and how elites displace individuals with lower societal status.

Satendra Kumar, “[Uttar Pradesh local elections 2015: money, muscle and manipulation in a village](#)” (2019) 58:1 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 43

Article describing village-level politics in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh with a focus on the 2015 elections. Though it does not mention corruption by name, it describes vote-buying, shadow candidates, conflicts of interest, candidate or voter intimidation, and other behaviors that would be considered criminal in many jurisdictions.

Sony Pellissery, “[Local Processes of National Corruption: Elite Linkages and Their Effects on Poor People in India](#)” (2007) 8:2 Global Crime 131

Analysis of social security provision in India and the role of local-level politicians and bureaucrats in creating opportunities for bribery, corruption, and favor-seeking that helps create and perpetuate systemic inequality.

Japan

David Gilmore, Elaine Wong & Yosuke Homma (Herbert Smith Freehills LLP), “[Anti-corruption and bribery in Japan](#)” (4 February 2019) online: *Lexology*

Descriptive note on Japan’s anti-corruption legislation, with examples of municipal bribery referenced and briefly described.

Hiroshi Ohashi, “[Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works](#)” (2009) 34:3 Review of Industrial Organization 267

Quantitative analysis of changes to procurement processes at the local government level in Japan, and their financial impacts. Study finds that procurement costs can be reduced up to 8% with improved transparency, with reductions in corruption and collusion as a possible explanatory factor.

Julian Ryall, “[15 members of Japanese municipal assembly embroiled in votes scandal](#)” (18 July 2014) online: *South China Morning Post*

News article describing allegations that municipal officials, comprising three quarters of the council, engaged in bribery and vote buying by exchanging cash for votes.

Malaysia

Maheran Zakaria, Rahayu Abdul Rahman & Hasnun Anip Bustaman, “[Exploring a Model of Whistle Blowing System for Malaysian Municipal Council](#)” (2020) 11:3 International Journal of Financial Research 62

Recommendations for the implementation of a whistleblowing system at the municipal level in Malaysia, as existing whistleblower legislation does not cover authorities at the local government level.

Pakistan

Muhammad Masood Rafi, Sarosh Hashmat Lodi & Nadeem Manzoor Hasan, “[Corruption in Public Infrastructure Service and Delivery: The Karachi Case Study](#)” (2012) 17:4 Public Works Management & Policy 370

Analysis of survey results on prevalence and nature of corruption in Karachi, Pakistan. Authors make recommendations for how the city should reduce corruption including salary raising, stronger punitive measures, effective journalism, and transparency. Focus is on city administration as opposed to elected officials.

Palestine

Azmi Al-Shu'eibi, Ra'eda Qandil & Viola Atallah, “[Local Integrity System Assessment: The Integrity Environment in Ramallah Municipality](#)” (2014) online: *Transparency International*

Transparency International's report on pilot application of Local Integrity Systems toolkit in Ramallah, Palestine. Identifies strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities in addressing corruption and integrity issues.

South Korea

Jun-min Lee & Ahjung Lee, “[Introduction to Korea's Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment](#)” (2016) online: *UNDP Seoul Policy Centre*

Handbook describing Korea's Anti-Corruption Initiative, which assesses various public institutions at all levels of government on a yearly basis. Results are published in a yearly report each January.⁴⁷ Handbook describes methodologies, results of 2014 AIA, and recommendations for other countries that may wish to implement a similar methodology.

Koung-sun, Min “[The effectiveness of anti-corruption policies: measuring the impact of anti-corruption policies on integrity in the public organizations of South Korea](#)” (2019) 71:2 *Crime, Law and Social Change* 217

Quantitative analysis of factors that impacted prevalence of corruption in 183 South Korean public entities between 2013 and 2016. Data is agnostic to level of government but includes data from municipal governments. Source has been included to provide a snapshot of effectiveness of South Korea's Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment, discussed in preceding source.

Seongcheol Kim, Hyun Jeong Kim & Heejin Lee, “[An institutional analysis of an e-government system for anti-corruption: The case of OPEN](#)” (2009) 26:1 *Government Information Quarterly* 42

⁴⁷ English copies of reports were unavailable, and as such could not be included in bibliography

Analysis of the implementation of OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for civil application) in Seoul and how e-government, when used correctly, can reduce corrupt behavior. OPEN is an online municipal service delivery platform that was created as an anti-corruption system. It was implemented at the national level following Seoul's success. Source also contains a comprehensive literature review of theories related to corruption.

Thailand

Katherine A. Bowie, "[Vote Buying and Village Outrage in an Election in Northern Thailand: Recent Legal Reforms in Historical Context](#)" (2008) 67:2 The Journal of Asian Studies 469

Analysis of village elections in Northern Thailand with a focus on the origins of vote buying as a practice, and the political and social frameworks that evolved to facilitate vote buying behaviors.

Oparin Sopchokchai, "[Good Local Governance and Anti-Corruption Through People's Participation: A Case of Thailand](#)" (Paper prepared for 10th International Anti-Corruption Conferences, Prague, 2001)

Paper evaluating the implementation of local governance in Thailand when government decentralized following the new Constitution of 1997. Analysis of governance frameworks, changes in laws, and participatory methods of preventing corruption throughout transition.

Africa

General

Carl Henrik Knutsen et al, “[Mining and Local Corruption in Africa](#)” (2017) 61:2 American Journal of Political Science 320

Assessment of South Africa’s mining sector and whether or not local governments have increasing levels of corruption when their economic activity is or becomes related to mining. Authors find that presence of mining projects increases prevalence of bribery and rent-seeking.

Dieter Zinnbauer, “[Leveraging the role of the urban planning profession for one of the central policy challenges of our times](#)” (2019), Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) Working Paper

Working paper as basis for “[Cities of Integrity: Urban planning and corruption in Africa](#)” project.⁴⁸ Highlights corruption issues and anti-corruption projects in Africa with an emphasis on urban planning and development’s role in pay-to-play, rent-seeking, and patronage-based corruption.

Ghana

Sarah Brierley, “[Local Government corruption in Ghana: Misplaced control and incentives](#)” (22 November 2017), online (blog): *International Growth Centre*

Brief overview of author’s study/survey results, arguing that the forms of discretionary power given to local politicians in conjunction with their appointment/election process result in a corrupt system.

Sarah Brierley, “[Procurement mismanagement and the politicisation of bureaucratic transfers in Ghana](#)” (1 Aug 2018), online (Policy Brief 33304): *International Growth Centre*

[From Summary] “This paper analyses public procurement practices within local governments in Ghana by looking at how common uncompetitive procurement practices are and the incentives bureaucrats have to facilitate them.”

Sarah Brierley, “[Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana](#)” (2020) 64:2 American Journal of Political Science 209

Analysis of interactions between the responsibilities and incentives of politicians and bureaucrats, and the resultant corruption in local governments in Ghana. Emphasis is placed on public procurement and the respective roles of bureaucrats and politicians in procurement processes.

⁴⁸ Led by Professor Vanessa Watson of University of Cape Town, research in progress throughout 2020

Kenya

“[Local Integrity System Assessment: Kwale & Kisumu Counties](#)” (2014) online: *Transparency International*

Transparency International’s report on pilot application of Local Integrity Systems toolkit in Kwale and Kisumu Counties, Kenya. Identifies strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities in addressing corruption and integrity issues.

Luke M Obala & Michael Mattingly, “[Ethnicity, corruption and violence in urban land conflict in Kenya](#)” (2013) 51:13 *Urban Studies* 2735

Analysis of corruption/land conflict in Kenya (the city of Nairobi in particular) and how corrupt actors impact their ethnic ingroups and outgroups. Study also considers the development of violence as a factor related to corrupt activity and land conflict.

Malawi

Richard I C Tambulasi, “[All that glitters is not gold: new public management and corruption in Malawi’s local governance](#)” (2009) 26:2 *Development Southern Africa* 173

Examination of the impacts of New Public Management reform (and a review of the concept) on levels of corruption at the local level of government in Malawi.

Senegal

Mouhamet Ndiongue & Mansour Mboup, “[Evaluation du System D’Intégrité Local: Ville de Guediawaye | Senegal](#)” (2014) online: *Transparency International*

[Source in French] Transparency International’s report on pilot application of Local Integrity Systems toolkit in Ville de Guediawaye, Senegal. Identifies strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities in addressing corruption and integrity issues.

South Africa

“[Promoting Good Governance and Accountability: Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy](#)” (2015) online: *Department of Provincial and Local Government, Republic of South Africa*

Policy document providing an overview of South Africa’s practices in preventing and responding to corruption at the municipal level. Of note is the definitions section which covers the scope of behaviors considered corrupt, as well as activities and officials that could be implicated in corrupt behavior.

“[Municipal Integrity Management Framework](#)” (2015) online: *Department of Cooperative Governance, Republic of South Africa*

Appendix A of South Africa’s Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy, which is listed above. Provides practical framework for applying recommendations of anti-corruption strategy.

[“Local Government in South Africa – Part 6, Procurement”](#) (25 March 2014) online: *Corruption Watch*

Brief summary of local procurement in South Africa, detailing the sector’s vulnerabilities to corruption and the regulating statutes. Parts 1-5 describe the structure of South African local government’s laws, actors, and finances.

Evangelos Mantzaris & Pregala Pillay, [“Supply Chain and Procurement Corruption in Local Government: The South African Experience”](#) in Petter Gottschalk & Perry Stanlislas, eds, *Public Corruption: Regional and National Perspectives on Procurement Fraud*, 1st ed, (New York: Routledge, 2017)

Book chapter highlighting the prevalence of procurement fraud in South Africa, the mechanisms that are employed in such fraud, and the regulatory mechanisms that attempt to limit fraud somewhat unsuccessfully.

Joan Chiedza Chamunorwa, [“An exploration of whistle blowing in fighting corruption in the public sector in South Africa: A case study of Stellenbosch Municipality”](#) (Master’s Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2015)

[From Abstract] “[T]his study focuses on employee perceptions of whistle blowing mechanisms within Stellenbosch Municipality as a case study, with the primary objective of ascertaining the importance of whistle blowing in curbing corruption in the public sector.”

Kola O. Odeku, [“Endemic Corruption in Supply Chain and Procurement in the Local Sphere of Government in South Africa”](#) (2018) 16:9 *Journal of Distribution Science* 43

[From Abstract] “This article extensively utilized [a] qualitative literature review approach to address and solve the problem of endemic corruption in the supply chain and procurement being perpetrated by local government officials [in South Africa].”

Tristan Dreisbach, [“Contested Terrain: Reforming Procurement Systems in South Africa 2013-2016”](#) (2017) online: *British Academy*

Case study highlighting South Africa’s need for procurement reform and the exact nature of such reform. Though not specifically municipally focused, provides context for other sources in this section and highlights municipal examples.

Zambia

Gilbert Siame, Laura Nkula -Wenz & Dieter Zinnbauer, [“Methodological Considerations for Researching Corruption and Building Urban Integrity – A Qualitative Action Experiment in Zambia”](#) (2020), Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) Working Paper

Second working paper from [Cities of Integrity](#) project. Describes the “Qualitative Action Experiment” research model and assesses its utility in researching urban corruption by

applying it to Zambian municipalities. Purpose of paper is primarily to explore the efficacy of corruption-related research methods.

Zimbabwe

JoAnn McGregor, "[Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-Sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe](#)" (2013) 39:4 Journal of Southern African Studies 783

Article exploring the infiltration of local governments by ZANU(PF)-aligned militia following Zimbabwe's democratization movement in the early 2000s. Discusses how militias coerced and surveilled politicians to ensure their desired outcomes.

Oceania

Australia⁴⁹

“[Annual Report 2018/19](#)” (2019) online: *Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission of Victoria*

Annual report of Victoria’s corruption commission. Broad overview of corruption in the state with [a directly linked Police subchapter](#) that addresses police misconduct.

“[City of Botany Bay Council – allegations concerning former chief financial officer \(Operation Ricco\)](#)” (2017) online: *Independent Commission Against Corruption of NSW*

Report on allegations of fraudulent payments exceeding \$4.2 million AUD detailing events, actors, and recommendations for the involvement of the Director of Public Prosecutions concerning charges under the NSW Crimes Act.

“[Communicating Anti-Corruption Messages in Community Languages: Guidelines for New South Wales Local Councils](#)” (2010) online: *NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption*

Brief case study of three anti-corruption investigations/operations at the local council level in New South Wales, Australia and recommendations that follow. Emphasis is placed on communicating ethics and local values to those who have migrated from countries where gifts or benefits that are customary could be considered bribes elsewhere.

“[Corruption allegations data dashboard](#)” online: *Crime and Corruption Commission of Queensland*

Open data dashboard detailing all statistics of allegations of corruption in state of Queensland. Filterable by level of government (e.g. local), form of alleged misconduct, year, etc.

“[Corruption and Integrity in the NSW Public Sector: An Assessment of Current Trends and Events](#)” (2018) online: *NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption*

Review of corruption in state of New South Wales at both state and local/municipal levels. Includes discussion of legislative changes, risk factors, and relevant statistics.

“[Investigation Reports](#)” online: *Independent Commission Against Corruption of NSW*

List of reports from anti-corruption investigations at various levels of government, including municipal governments/local councils.

“[Investigation Summaries](#)” online: *Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission of Victoria*

⁴⁹ Australian anti-corruption agencies are managed at the State level but oversee corruption issues related to municipal governments and local councils.

List of Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission of Victoria (IBAC) investigations, divided by level of government. There are seven local council investigations listed on the web page.

“[Local government integrity frameworks review](#)” (2019) online: *Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission of Victoria*

Report on practices and policy frameworks of six local councils in the state of Victoria, evaluating and comparing perceptions of corruption, risk management, corruption control, risks, ethical leadership, detection, and reporting with objective of providing guidance for other municipalities.

“[Operation Belcarra – A blueprint for integrity and addressing corruption risk in local government](#)” (2017) online: *Crime and Corruption Commission of Queensland*

Following allegations of misconduct in 2016 Queensland local government elections, the state body investigated and provided an overview of issues and recommendations. There is also a comparison of local election regulations relating to donation disclosures and campaign expenditure from Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia (only Adelaide), and Tasmania.

Allan Yates & Adam Graycar, “[Death by a Thousand Cuts: Recognizing, Reporting, and Responding to Corruption in Local Government](#)” (2020) 22:1 Public Integrity 85

Analysis of how local government employees in NSW, Australia understand corruption both criminal and non-criminal, report it, and how reports are followed up on. Analysis is also done on how an aggregate culture of minor corruption can exist and be perpetuated.

Allan Yates, “[Corruption and administration in local government](#)” in Adam Graycar, ed, *Handbook on Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2020)

Exploration of ‘particularism’ – where advancement and appointments are based off connections, not merit – in local governments in New South Wales, Australia.

Alan MacSporran, Nikola Stepanov & Kathleen Florian, “[Local Government: Roles and Functions of Queensland Integrity Agencies, Live Webcast](#)” (2020) online (webcast): *Crime and Corruption Commission of Queensland*

From site: “Three of Queensland’s integrity agencies partnered to equip newly-elected and existing Local Government councillors and mayors with information to assist them in understanding the integrity agencies’ roles and functions, and the obligations these officials hold under their respective legislation.”

Adam B. Masters & Adam Graycar, “[Making Corruption Disappear in Local Government](#)” (2016) 18:1 Public Integrity 42

Analysis of perceived and actual corruption in local governments in Australia and the role of both national and sub-national integrity systems on such corruption. Focus is on bribery

in local governments in the state of Victoria and challenges in creating accountability for corruption.

Adam Graycar & Tim Prenzler, “Designing out Corruption in Urban Planning” in [*Understanding and Preventing Corruption*](#) (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 127

Brief analysis of corruption in urban planning using anecdotes from Australia and New Jersey, followed by a “Types, Activities, Sectors, and Places” (TASP) analysis of Wollongong City Council with recommendations geared towards preventing corruption and bribery in planning processes.

Muhammad Azizul Islam, “[Bribery and corruption in Australian local councils](#)” (2014) 34:6 Public Money & Management 441

Assessment of opportunities for fraud and corruption in local council governments in Australia, with emphasis on bribery and recommendations for its prevention.